Aktuelle Publikationen

When studying the constitutional choice of European voting rules, most power index analyses concentrate on member states' relative decisiveness for forming winning coalitions in the Council of Ministers. These studies have two shortcomings: (a) They ignore the distribution of relative power between the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, as defined by the multi-cameral European legislative procedures. (b) They disregard the absolute notion of power, which is dependent on the inclusion of member states in winning coalitions under various voting rules. In this article we present our approach on member states' constitutional choice of European voting rules with regard to the two notions of power: actors' relative decisiveness and their absolute inclusiveness in decision making. We present an index to measure inclusiveness and apply our concept to the European multi-cameral legislature. On the basis of our study, we present a reasoned account of motives behind member states' recent institutional reforms of legislative procedures.

Integration theorists disagree over the extent to which the European Parliament can substantially influence policy-making processes in the absence of formal agendasetting power. This article discusses the impact the European Parliament had on the current enlargement negotiations. Although the legislature does not yet possess the means to alter the stance of the European Council, it has tried to reverse the status quo through the use of its informal bargaining power. We argue based on a principal-agent framework of analysis that the effectiveness of this strategy is largely a consequence of the ability to speak with one voice. The article evaluates various mechanisms to help the European Parliament build a unified position. It refutes socialisation and specialisation theories, showing that party group pressure towards a unified position overrode national concerns and constituted a necessary precondition in the development of an integrationist attitude. A statistical analysis of the pre-bargaining positions inside the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee largely confirms the insights from qualitative interviews with participants and observers.

Acentral goal of the Third United Nations Conference on the Lawof the Sea 1973-1982was to establish an international order for the use of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. An overwhelming majority of countries signed the comprehensive convention, but several countries including the industrialized G7 members Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the formerWest Germany rejected the new ocean regime in 1982. This article addresses the question of why some states opposed the 1982 convention by examining their preferences for alternative decision-making rules. A policy-seeking approach is used by deriving the preferences of 149 states for different decision-making rules from three components: states preferences for policies, the working properties of different decision-making rules, and the location of the status quo. Findings showwhy the 1982 proposal failed to be supported by the main industrialized countries. Some evidence exists for the successful foundation of a multicameral rule in 1994.

dc.title:

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has been very successful as a mechanism for resolving environmental conflict in the United States. Although it has rarely been used in Europe, European social scientists still have high expectations of its potential to achieve consensual, fair solutions and, in so doing, to increase the general welfare. The promised outcome, it is hoped, can be accomplished through a cooperative procedure resting on extended participation, transparency and procedural justice. In the first part of this paper it is argued that the success or failure of ADR depends not only on the procedure itself, but also on exogenous factors. Three types of exogenous factor can be distinguished. First, there are exogenous restrictions to possible solutions: the opportunities for negotiated agreements depend upon the physical, technical and economic feasibility of potential solutions, as well as upon the law. Second, the course and the result of the negotiation is restricted by the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) of the disputants; these alternatives are mostly determined by external factors. Third, in collective bargaining the room for negotiation is also limited by political directives from the negotiator's constituencies or supervisors. The second part of this paper is devoted to a case study of the mediation in the waste management programme of Neuss County, Germany. This mediation attempted mainly to resolve a conflict over the siting of a waste incineration plant. It ended without consensus. It will be shown how exogenous restrictions, outside options and political guidelines influenced the course of the mediation, how they enlarged or diminished the negotiation space and, ultimately, how they determined the final outcome.

dc.title:

dc.contributor.author: Seifer, Bettina