Aktuelle Publikationen

This article studies the conditions required by populist radical right actors to convincingly create a sense of crisis. The article draws on the literature on political blame games and policy feedback to argue that it is not only the salience of an event that determines its ‘populist exploitability’, but also its proximity to mass publics – or more simply, how directly and closely it affects citizens. In the study, Moffitt’s stepwise model of populist crisis performance is extended and expectations are formulated regarding how the proximity of an event influences the various steps of crisis performance. The article then tests this theoretical argument with a within-unit analysis of the crisis performance of a populist radical right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), during the refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis suggests that the pandemic’s proximity to people’s daily lives narrowed and complicated the AfD’s crisis performance in important ways. The article sheds light on the determinants of the success of populist radical right parties and nuances our understanding of the broader relationship between populism and crisis.

List proportional representation with candidate voting can facilitate policy representation in multiple dimensions. However, candidates with deviating positions may not benefit if cues such as shared socio-demographics drive candidate choice instead. Does this use of cues reflect a lack of policy-related information or a preference for descriptive representation? We study this question in a real-world context, using a survey-embedded experiment that emulates actual vote choice shortly after the 2019 Swiss elections. We vary the level of information on candidates’ policy positions in zero, one or two dimensions (left–right, environment). Our results show that spatial proximity voting increases with better information on the secondary (but not the first) dimension, indicating that information can improve the alignment of (environmental) policy views between voters and candidates. In turn, same-gender and same-age voting slightly decreases when more information is available. The preference for local candidates remains strong. Our results inform debates regarding citizens’ preferences for different types of representation and how electoral systems moderate their expression.

Climate change and most climate policies affect and reinforce different forms of inequalities. For instance, climate change policies that aim to change consumer behavior by increasing the price tag of goods and services that cause carbon emissions often carry a disproportionately higher burden (in terms of financial cost) to those with lower incomes. They can thereby either exacerbate existing income inequalities or contribute to generating new ones. Meanwhile, refraining from engaging with climate mitigation policies will incur other detrimental societal costs: the financial burden and the harmful consequences of climate change that future generations will have to bear if nothing is done. In this paper, we examine how the immediate economic inequality citizens face from climate mitigation policies (regarding carbon taxation) weighs against the long-term generational inequalities future generations will experience. We study how both types of inequality relate to policy support for climate change mitigation policies in the context of Germany. The German case is of special interest because a recent court ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court allows us to test whether making people aware of a new legal reality can bridge the gap between the economic and generational inequality. Our findings using a between-subjects survey experiment fielded among German citizens (N=6,319) in 2022 show that immediate economic concerns trump future generational concerns, generally making citizens less supportive of the policy. This negative support is, however, somewhat mitigated by the supportive signal from the court ruling.

Internet shutdowns have become a popular instrument for repressive regimes to silence dissent in a digitized world. While authorities seek to suppress opponents by imposing Internet outages, we know little about how the public reacts to such incisive measures. The regime might face anger and resentment from the public as a response to Internet deprivation. Why do regimes still use Internet shutdowns when they do not only face economic but also societal losses? In this paper, I argue that Internet shutdowns lower the public’s evaluation of the political leadership as citizens blame the government for the service outages. For the analysis, I combine fine-grained data on Internet outages with survey data from the Afrobarometer and apply an “unexpected event during survey design.” Results show that citizens do not hold the government accountable for Internet disruptions, thus making Internet shutdowns a powerful tool for autocrats to silent dissent digitally.

Over the last decades, many democracies progressed in the political inclusion of Indigenous people and the recognition of their rights. Does this contribute to how satisfied Indigenous people are with how democracy works? Prior empirical evidence suggests it does. As yet, there is, however, little study of the underlying mechanisms and we should not assume a categorically positive correlation between political equality and satisfaction with democracy. Instead, Indigenous affairs need to be sufficiently politicized to matter for Indigenous people's satisfaction with democracy. I test this argument in the case of the Sámi people in Norway and Sweden. While political inequality is comparatively higher in Sweden, Sámi issues are less politicized. Using novel original survey data, I find that here, satisfaction with democracy is not correlated with Sámi ethnicity. Satisfaction levels among Norwegian Sámi, though, are significantly lower than among their non-Indigenous compatriots and strongly shaped by considerations of political inequality.

Bringing together 150+ scholars and practitioners from 50+ countries, and funded by the European Commission, COST Action LeverAge (https://www.cost.eu/actions/CA22120/) is the first network-building project of its kind in the work and organizational psychology and human resource management (WOP/HRM) aspects of work and aging. Focused on the aging workforce, the Action aims to foster interdisciplinary and multinational scientific excellence and the translation of science to practical and societal impact across 4 years. Based on a research synthesis, we identify five broad research directions for work and aging science including work and organizational practices for a multi-age workforce, successful aging at work, the integration of age-diverse workers and knowledge transfer, aging and technology at work, and career development in later life and retirement. We provide key research questions to guide scientific inquiry along these five research directions alongside best practice recommendations to expand scholarly impact in WOP/HRM.

In the highly competitive field of publishing in economics journals, methods often become fads sometimes to the detriment of framing meaningful research agendas and of research ethics. In recent times, empirical work based on primary data collection has gained traction. Randomized controlled trials entail not just primary data collection but also interventions involving human subjects. Field research involving data collection is also expensive, raising a number of concerns. In this special symposium we explore questions of research agendas and research ethics, and argue fo rthe acceptance of broader methodological approaches, greater inclusion in the publication process and for a reflection at the disciplinary level of practices related to field research.

Numerous studies show that properly designed economic sanctions can force the target to refrain from violating international norms. However, policymakers cannot integrate this finding into their ex ante assessments of whether more forceful coercive measures could prevent military coups, human rights violations, or a war of aggression such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this article, we address this shortcoming and introduce counterfactual predictions to answer the what-if question of whether adequate sanctions by the European Union and the United States could have provoked targets to abandon severe norm violations. To this end, a training data set from 1989 to 2008 is used to predict the success of sanctions from 2009 to 2015. Our policy counterfactuals for key sanction cases suggest that stricter EU coercion against Russia after the annexation of Crimea could have triggered policy concessions from the regime of President Putin.

While research on organised interests in Central and Eastern Europe has recently boomed, most studies focus on the micro-level, i.e. organisational development, and macro-level factors such as Europeanisation and democratic backsliding. So far however, little research has been dedicated to the meso-level, that is inter-organisational cooperation. We argue that inter-organisation cooperation in the region is driven by (a combination of) three central factors: organisational anxiety, democratic backsliding and Europeanisation effects. We draw on an original survey dataset of Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Slovenian interest groups, which enables us to test our hypotheses with a view to the four country contexts.

How do citizens perceive labor market risks related to digitalization and the green transition, and how do these risk perceptions translate into preferences for social policies? We address these questions in this paper by studying the policy preferences of individual workers on how governments should deal with the two labor market challenges of digitalization and the green transition. Employing novel cross-country comparative survey data including a vignette experiment for six advanced postindustrial economies, we probe to what extent the different labor market challenges are associated with differences in preferences, distinguishing between support for social investment policies on the one hand and compensatory policies on the other. A first finding is that even though individuals perceive different levels of labor market risk due to the green transition and digitalization, their preferences for social policy responses do not differ systematically across the two risks. Instead, we find that social policy preferences are affected by individual-level and, to some extent, country-level contextual factors. Confirming previous work, higher perceived labor market risk is associated with more support for compensatory policies but less support for social investment.

Public procurement is crucial for effective crisis responses, but is also prone to corruption. To ensure a swift provision of medical supplies in the COVID-19 pandemic, the public procurement regulations were dramatically relaxed. However, the implications for corruption require attention. This paper analyses how the regulatory responses to the crisis affected the risks and perceptions of corruption, by changing public-private interactions and the regulatory environment for public procurement. We compare the contrasting cases of Italy and Germany and triangulate legal analyses, secondary contract and survey data, and an online survey of public administrations (N = 445) and businesses (N = 175). Unexpectedly, in both countries, objective risks of corruption increased similarly. Sector-specific corruption perceptions stem from a low competitiveness of procedures, rule ambiguity, and a politicised bureaucracy. To avoid wasting resources and losing trust, regulatory responses to the crisis should include clear rules that safeguard competitive public procurement procedures and preserve bureaucratic independence.

Member states use implementation to preserve core state powers, such as fiscal policy, vis-à-vis the European Union (EU), by choosing whether to adopt stricter or looser rules than the EU requires. However, these choices and their reasons when the EU extends its fiscal competences are understudied. We theorise how the interplay of uploading and downloading factors might lead member states to customise EU fiscal policy according to their preferences, if their capacity allows it. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we study the customisation of six rules of the Fiscal Compact in France, Germany and Italy in 2012 (N = 18). Member states exercised ‘opposition through the back door’ when uploading outcomes did not reflect their preferences and did not provide a credible deterrent. More often, however, member states as ‘customisers’ acted as especially ambitious problem-solvers or signalled compliance, when uploading outcomes reflected their preferences or provided a credible enforcement threat.

If European Union (EU) member states realise differentiations in EU Treaties, what effect do we see on public and political support for future integration? We argue on the basis of a two-tier integration theory and postfunctionalism that differentiations of member states do lead to a preference for slower future integration by its citizens and parties. Once citizens and parties are used to opting out, they demand more of the same in the future. We test our arguments with time-series cross-sectional data for 1994–2018 on all voluntary primary law opt-outs in the EU. Our panel matching estimates demonstrate that opt-outs decrease integration support. After a differentiation, parties become more Eurosceptic on average and publics express a lower preference for future integration. This suggests that differentiated integration is not a cure against Euroscepticism that leads to a unified EU in the future but rather reinforces two-tier integration.

Aktuelle Forschung verbindet populistische Einstellungen von BürgerInnen mit ökonomischen Sorgen, Gefühlen fehlender Anerkennung oder politischer Unzufriedenheit. Dieser Artikel untersucht, welche konkreten wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Einstellungen BürgerInnen mit Populismus verknüpfen. Argumentiert wird, dass die Bewertung konflikthafter vertikaler gesellschaftlicher Relationen die Zusammenhänge strukturiert: Als ökonomische Oben-Unten-Relationen werden das Verhältnis von Staat zu WirtschaftsakteurInnen und von ressourcenreich zu ressourcenarm begriffen. Populismus definiert sich über die politische Oben-Unten-Relation zwischen Elite und Volk. Wird das „Oben“ jeweils als Problem bewertet, kann diese vertikale Konfliktachse beide Einstellungsdimensionen verbinden. Regressionsanalysen auf Basis der ALLBUS 2018 zeigen, wie erwartet, dass die Ablehnung staatlicher Eingriffe in die Wirtschaft, aber auch die Befürwortung von Umverteilung und eine Skepsis im Bereich Außenwirtschaft mit populistischen Einstellungen verbunden sind. Wahrnehmungen ökonomischer Missstände beeinflussen die Stärke der Zusammenhänge kaum statistisch signifikant. Parteipräferenzen schwächen nur die Assoziationen bezüglich der Außenwirtschaft ab. Mit der Bewertung konflikthafter Oben-Unten-Relationen bietet der Artikel eine Erklärung für die ideologisch inkonsistenten Zusammenhänge an. Um deren Mobilisierung nicht rechtspopulistischen Parteien zu überlassen, sollten auch andere Parteien die vertikalen Konflikte adressieren, ohne dabei Grundpfeiler der westlichen Demokratie zu gefährden.

Agile refers to a work management ideology with a set of productivity frameworks that support continuous and iterative progress on work tasks by reviewing one's hypotheses, working in a human‐centric way, and encouraging evidence‐based learning. In practice, public administrations have started to use agile principles and methods to plan projects, work in short sprints, iterate after receiving feedback from stakeholders, and apply a human‐centric approach to arrive at prototyped solutions. To understand the opportunities and challenges public servants perceive when they are asked to apply agile work practices, I conducted focus groups to study the social affordances of agile governance that need to be in place for public servants to adopt an agile mindset and its related practices. As a result of the exposure to agile work practices, public servants are either able to perceive its affordances and are willing to adopt agile, they falsely perceive them or they even remain hidden from them leading to a rejection of agile.

The paper deals with the European Company (SE), the first supranational company form. The focal question is its impact on the development of transnational employment relations. We show that only a minority of SEs has set up SE Works Councils and we discuss the reasons for this non-compliance. Board-level employee representation (BLER), the other form of voice, is even less common. We compare both concepts and reveal that the SE’s contribution to the development of transnational employment relations remains limited. By placing the SE in a broader perspective, we conclude that it fits the general pattern of limited progress towards ‘Europeanization’.

Abstract Public service ecosystems are used to understand how multiple actors co‐produce public services and create public value. Especially interactions between public service providers and service users are essential. However, systematic examinations of these interactions and what roles the different actors play are rare. This study closes this gap by conducting a systematic literature review with three main findings. First, public service providers play an important role: they facilitate co‐production by micromanaging or facilitating collaboration, empowering service users, and translating the results of the process back into the organization. Second, service users contribute to co‐production by providing resources. Third, a new category of actors is proposed: the co‐production intermediary. Intermediaries are formal organizations whose primary role is to support service providers in service delivery. This study comprehensively analyzes the different actors and power constellations between them.

Differentiated integration is often considered a solution to gridlock in the European Union. However, questions remain concerning its perceived legitimacy among the public. While research shows that most citizens are not, in principle, opposed to differentiated integration – although support varies across different differentiated integration models and different country contexts – we still know little about the role institutional design plays in citizens’ evaluations of differentiated integration. This article inspects how citizens evaluate different hypothetical differentiated integration arrangements, with varying decision-making procedures, using a conjoint experiment. We ask whether institutional arrangements can overcome citizens’ preference heterogeneity over differentiated integration, and thereby foster the legitimacy of a differentiated European Union. We find that while a majority of citizens care about the inclusiveness of differentiated integration arrangements, they also support limiting the number of veto points. Our analysis also reveals noteworthy differences across citizens with pro- and anti-European Union attitudes in the perceived fairness of differentiated integration arrangements.

In surveys, Europeans routinely express high levels of support for a common security and defence policy of the European Union. Do these responses reflect real demands or superficial support that would crumble if the issue was politicised? This article provides new answers to this question. We conducted pre-registered survey experiments with more than 40,000 respondents from 25 European countries in which we randomly varied whether respondents received information about potential costs of two hypothetical cooperative activities: military operations and defence procurement. Support for these activities was systematically lower when costs were mentioned. We conclude that, in the event of politicisation, there is considerable potential for shifts in opinion and that caution is required in deriving a mandate for specific activities from high approval rates for cooperation in general.

On digital media, algorithms that process data and recommend content have become ubiquitous. Their fast and barely regulated adoption has raised concerns about their role in well-being both at the individual and collective levels. Algorithmic mechanisms on digital media are powered by social drivers, creating a feedback loop that complicates research to disentangle the role of algorithms and already existing social phenomena. Our brief overview of the current evidence on how algorithms affect well-being, misinformation, and polarization suggests that the role of algorithms in these phenomena is far from straightforward and that substantial further empirical research is needed. Existing evidence suggests that algorithms mostly reinforce existing social drivers, a finding that stresses the importance of reflecting on algorithms in the larger societal context that encompasses individualism, populist politics, and climate change. We present concrete ideas and research questions to improve algorithms on digital platforms and to investigate their role in current problems and potential solutions. Finally, we discuss how the current shift from social media to more algorithmically curated media brings both risks and opportunities if algorithms are designed for individual and societal flourishing rather than short-term profit.