Aktuelle Publikationen

War and crises affect mental health, social attitudes, and cultural norms, which can exacerbate the state of long-term insecurity. With decades of armed conflict, the Democratic Republic of Congo is one example, and violence has become normalized in civilian settings. In this study, we tested the effectiveness of the NETfacts health system, an integrated model of evidence-based individual trauma treatment (Narrative Exposure Therapy [NET]) and a trauma-informed community-based intervention (NETfacts). Alongside changes in mental health outcomes (posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, social disapproval, and shame) we also investigated change in attitudes, including rape myth acceptance, stigmatization of survivors of sexual violence, and skepticism about the reintegration of former combatants. To test whether the additional community intervention is superior to individual NET alone, we implemented a randomized controlled design with six villages and interviewed a sample of 1,066 community members. Our results demonstrate that the NETfacts health system in comparison with NET alone more effectively reduced rape myth acceptance and with it ongoing victimization and perpetration. Community members of the NETfacts group also presented with less stigmatizing attitudes against survivors of sexual violence. Skepticism about the reintegration of former combatants declined in both groups. NETfacts appears to have increased motivation to engage in individual treatment. Synergizing the healing effects of individual and collective trauma exposure, the NETfacts health system appears to be an effective and scalable approach to correct degrading or ignominious norms and restore functioning and mental health in postconflict communities.

The aging population implies a wider age range within a workforce, increasing the risk of age diversity as separation (the clustering into age-based subgroups), which is considered a turnover stimulator. We provide a new theoretical perspective to age diversity and turnover research, arguing that age separation may not only increase turnover through perceived age discrimination (i.e., a self-categorization perspective), but can also reduce it through increased perceived belongingness (i.e., a social identity perspective). Following the idea of asymmetric diversity effects, we propose the workforce's average age as a crucial moderator. A longitudinal sample of 2,393 Belgian organizations (2012-2015) reveals that firm-level age separation stimulates firm-level collective voluntary turnover, but only in firms with an older average age (Study 1). Data from a representative sample of 4,764 employees from six European countries are consistent with the idea that perceived age separation stimulates aging workers’ turnover intention through increased perceived discrimination and reduced belongingness, and reduces younger workers’ turnover intention through increased belongingness (Study 2). These findings support that age diversity conceptualized as separation is not as unmistakably detrimental for turnover as previously assumed and affects younger and older employees and workforces differently. From a practical perspective, understanding the role of age in the age separation–turnover relationship may help organizations to prevent the loss of valuable knowledge through the departure of both older and younger employees.

Rapid technological change – the digitalization and automation of work – is challenging contemporary welfare states. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on its effect on labor market outcomes, such as employment or wage levels. In contrast, this paper studies the implications of technological change for welfare state attitudes and preferences. Compared to previous work on this topic, this paper adopts a much broader perspective regarding different kinds of social policy. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that individual automation risk is positively associated with support for redistribution, but negatively with support for social investment policies (partly depending on the specific measure of automation risk that is used), while there is no statistically significant association with support for basic income. We also find a moderating effect of the overall size of the welfare state on the micro-level association between risk and preferences.

Do citizens expect candidates who hand out goods at election time to provide services once they take office? The literature provides competing views of the relationship between electoral handouts and service provision. One sees handouts as pre-payment for the vote in lieu of future services; the second understands them as signaling the candidate’s ability to provide future services. In this paper, we examine how electoral handouts may affect expectations of future service provision. We focus on the poor because they are most dependent on such service provision, and on expectations because they are more easily identified and are likely to reflect past experience. We argue the density of social ties within the community should moderate the relationship between candidates’ campaign handouts and expectations of future services. We test this argument using hierarchical models to analyze observational and experimental data from over 14,000 poor Kenyans, Malawians, and Zambians in 631 communities. We find that respondents generally view monetary handouts to be in lieu of future services. However, we also find important differences in communities with more and less dense social ties. Vote-buying is more common and seen as more acceptable in socially dense than in less dense communities. Respondents from socially dense communities are also less likely to expect future service provision; however, they do not see candidates who give handouts as significantly less likely to provide services than those who do not. Indeed, there is evidence that not providing handouts in these communities may signal the candidate’s inability to provide services. These findings highlight the importance of considering how communities’ social density affects expectations over service provision and the need to consider, more broadly, how social context affects the distributive consequences of clientelism.

This study focuses on the dynamic managerial capabilities of smart city managers and the organizational readiness of a city administration required to drive smart city transformation. After reviewing the literature, we conducted semi-structured interviews with smart city managers in 40 smart cities. We identified five dynamic capabilities that effectively contribute to smart city transformation: seizing, sensing, innovation, integrative, and empowering capability. Our analysis also reveals that a city administration's organizational readiness plays a critical role in these transformative processes and relies on four factors: innovation readiness, resource readiness, a participatory and collective mindset, and strategic readiness. Based on our findings, we suggest a theoretical framework composed of 10 propositions that describe the mutual influences of these dynamic managerial capabilities and organizational readiness factors, together with their contributions to smart city transformation. We conclude with a discussion of the limitations and the implications for future research and practice.

Conventional wisdom suggests that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) contain environmental standards because the highly regulated North imposes these standards on the reluctant South. But what about the increasing occurrence of environmental standards in South-South trade agreements? Are they simply a product of a diffusion process from North-South PTAs? Or do environmental standards in South-South PTAs signal real commitment to both environmental regulation and performance? We test these two perspectives against each other by quantitatively examining original data on environmental provisions in 479 PTAs. Using performance-based indicators our results support the notion that if developing countries take on the obligation of committing to environmental. When relying on a measure on commitment levels in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the results rather point to the diffusion-based perspective. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, the study shows that environmental protection is not always extrinsically motivated by developed countries.

The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology has evolved remarkably in social science research. Simultaneously, the use of QCA too often lags behind methodological recommendations of good practice. Improper use is a serious obstacle for QCA to enrich the social science methodology toolkit. We explore whether the coherence of analytic approaches can help us understand good practices in applied QCA by performing a systematic review of 86 QCA studies. Although adherence to technical GPs has improved over time, we find a high prevalence of incoherent, “hybrid” approaches. As the hybridity of a study increases, its adherence to good practices decreases. The case-oriented, realist, exploratory QCA studies do not consistently follow recommendations of good practice. Instead, the only consistently good-practice approach is case-oriented, realist, but explicitly theory-evaluating. We conclude that consistently aligning methodological choice with the underlying analytic approach and the use of theory can help foster good practices in applied QCA.

Attempting to reconcile the diverse immigration policy demands of the ‘old’ working class and the ‘new’ middle class, social democratic parties struggle to take a clear position on immigration policy. Adopting more restrictive policies is a possible way forward, but this is likely to lead to electorally costly intra-party conflict. This article illuminates the conditions under which social democratic parties can unite behind more restrictive immigration policies and promote them consistently. Employing a most-similar systems design, it presents a comparative case study of the Austrian and Danish social democrats, from the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ to 2020. The article argues that low levels of territorial decentralisation enabled the Danish social democrats to promote a restrictive stance on immigration top-down, while the Austrian social democrats’ federal party structure exacerbated internal disagreements between urban and rural leaders. These findings highlight the importance of internal party characteristics in explaining how parties respond to strategic trade-offs. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1975211

There is little doubt that supply-side populism associates with radical platforms of the left and the right. However, few empirical analyses have focused on the connection between left-right ideological radicalism and populism at the individual level, even less in countries where populist discourses are not only associated with the radical right. This paper considers the association between populist attitudes and ideological radicalism in two countries where left-wing populist parties exist: France and Spain. For that, it uses an approach to political ideology that distinguishes political-economic issues and political-cultural ones. Main results show that radically minded individuals, located at the left and the right of the ideological axis, display stronger populist attitudes in France and Spain. However, differences between the two countries exist that highlight the relevance of context-dependent associations between populism and other (thick) ideologies in the electoral arena. In France, individuals located at the extreme right of the cultural dimension tend to show stronger populist attitudes than those located at the far left. In contrast, in Spain, individuals located at the extreme left of the economic and cultural dimensions display stronger populist attitudes.

Countless scholars have explored the emergence, stability and transformation of interest intermediation structures in western democracies and beyond [Jahn, “Changing of the Guard”; Schmitter, “Corporatism is Dead!”; Siaroff, “Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies”.]. In this article we take a new avenue by exploring the “micro-level” impact of (quasi-)representation monopolies and high or low access on organized interests, namely at the level of groups themselves. Looking at Central and Eastern European organizations, we assess how the inclusion within or exclusion from frequent interactions with the state impacts the internal development of organized interests? Do excluded groups seek to professionalize their operations to increase their chances of eventually accessing policy-makers? Do they expand ties with other groups to increase their joint political clout? Or do they flee the national political arena and focus more on regional- or European-level activities? Based on a survey of Central and Eastern European organized interests, the analysis reveals that political inclusion indeed strongly enhances organizational development and intergroup cooperation. Yet, we also show that even occasional political participation boosts the lobbying capacities of organizations, in particular younger, mainly civic organizations. Altogether, the data shed positive light on the responsiveness of interest organizations operating in a region previously often overlooked in interest group research.

One of the structural problems of introductory lectures is that students’ learning progress is primarily assessed by taking a final exam. Weekly preparation and reading are driven only by self-motivation. Can a student’s decision to complete her weekly assignments be influenced by a simple reminder? In a pre-registered experimental design, we test if personalised reminders from the instructor delivered via text messages contribute to learning outcomes. We assess formative learning via regular quizzes at the beginning of each class, and summative learning via grades in a final exam. We do not find statistically significant differences in learning outcomes, and discuss how design features potentially drive this result. In the conclusion, we stress the importance of experimental design in assessing innovative and new learning techniques.

Illiberal regimes use overt and covert political communication to influence public opinion in democracies. We present an argument about how such propaganda impacts targeted publics. We posit that effectiveness depends on whether the source of the message is revealed, on the nature of the issue, and on individual characteristics of the recipients. We test these propositions in Germany, in the context of Kremlin messaging, using eight survey experiments administered to a large sample of German voters (n = 2, 303). Citizens who mistrust the government, believe in conspiracy theories, or are generally disconnected from politics are vulnerable to propaganda warfare that involves anti-mainstream messaging, while the rest of the populace is not. At the same time, providing a pro-Western, mainstream viewpoint and outing the Russian source are not generally effective countermeasures. We discuss the implications of illiberal regime communication for information wars between states and for the internal workings of democratic politics.

The COVID-19 pandemic represents an enormous challenge for healthcare systems around the globe. Using original panel survey data for the case of Germany, this article studies how specific trust in the healthcare system to cope with this crisis has evolved during the course of the pandemic and whether this specific form of trust is associated with general political trust. The article finds strong evidence for a positive and robust association between generalized political trust and performance perceptions regarding the efficiency and fairness of the crisis response as well as individual treatment conditions. The article also shows that specific trust in healthcare remained relatively stable throughout 2020, but declined significantly in the spring of 2021.

Motivated by empirical reality of differences in the scope and meaning of school choice and private schooling this article focuses on the public demand for increasing diversity of educational options In Europe and the division of public and private provision in it. We aim to test self-interest and ideology-driven logics of education policy preferences in different educational contexts. We operationalize this variety of contexts by the share of private education spending and between-school inequality. We show that, on average, more resourceful individuals are less pro-private-education and those that are ideologically right-leaning are more so. At the system level, private schooling feeds back positively, and this does not differ across educational or ideological divides. Educational inequality, at the same time, de-legitimizes the support for private schooling and its effect differs – higher educated and ideologically right-leaning turn to prefer more public schooling the higher the educational inequality. Thus, the more equal the educational provision, independent of public-private mix, the more entrenched pro-private school preferences will become.

John Rawls’s political liberalism demands that reasonable citizens comply with the duty of civility, which limits the justification of state action to public reasons. However, many religious citizens in liberal democratic societies reject the exclusion of religious reasons from public debate. What can be done to encourage these citizens to endorse public reason? Rawls proposes the idea of reasoning from conjecture (RC), i.e. directly engaging with someone’s comprehensive doctrine and showing them that such a doctrine actually supports public reason. In this article, we argue that reasoning from conjecture faces serious objections and that interfaith dialogue (ID) provides a better and more effective tool to encourage religious citizens to endorse public reason. More specifically, ID provides support to public reason by (i) relying on the principles of equality, sincerity and self-criticism, which are also central to public reason; (ii) leading participants to de-parochialize religion; and (iii) promoting tolerance. Moreover, ID avoids the main objections faced by RC, which undermine the latter’s morality and effectiveness.

The gender gap pervades many core aspects of political science. This article reports that females continue to be under-represented as authors and reviewers in European Union Politics and that these differences have only diminished slightly since the second half of the 2000s. We also report that females use more cautious and modest language in their correspondence with the editorial office, but do not find evidence that this under-studied aspect of the gender gap affects the outcome of the reviewing process. The authors discuss some measures European Union Politics and other journals might take to address the imbalance.

In recent decades, European welfare states have adopted demanding active labour market policies (ALMPs), aimed at increasing labour market participation through imposing stricter work-related obligations and benefit cuts in case of job offer rejection. This article investigates whether support for such demanding ALMPs is driven by risk perceptions of future unemployment and negative stereotypes about unemployed persons. Insights into the role of risk perceptions and stereotypes offer opportunities to gain a better understanding of the impact of structural variables. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey 2016 in 21 European countries, the analysis reveals that higher subjective risk of unemployment decreases support for these ALMPs substantially, whereas negative perceptions of the unemployed increase support. However, these factors play at the individual level only and do not explain country-level differences in support of demanding ALMPs. The notable cross-national variation in support of activation policies is found to be unrelated to economic factors and to the strictness of activation requirements for unemployment benefits.

The COVID-19 outbreak in Europe has brought attention to EU health policy as a focal point for solidarity, particularly as it concerns access to medicines. Against the backdrop of policy proposals for EU joint procurement of medicines, this article expands our understanding of public opinion towards this particular aspect of European integration. Drawing on data from a conjoint experiment in five EU countries, the study investigates the extent to which citizens’ preferences concerning alternative policy designs for EU joint procurement of medicines are either structured along a pro-EU versus anti-EU or ideological divide, or are crisis driven by the perceived COVID-19 threat. The analysis reveals that individual preferences over the design of EU risk pooling for medicines are most strongly explained by Euroscepticism, while egalitarian ideology plays only a modest role. How citizens’ perceived threat of COVID-19 affects their preferences for this form of EU risk pooling is dependent on the national context.

China’s involvement in African countries has been criticized for being guided by self-interest rather than recipient need or merit. For the period 2000–2012, we compare China’s aid allocation behaviour to that of the five largest donor countries globally: France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA. We use regression analysis and a rigorous variance decomposition method to measure the importance of various factors in predicting aid commitments. We find that donors differ markedly in how they allocate aid. While Germany, Japan, the USA, and the UK assign high importance to recipient need, France’s and China’s allocation models are, for a large part, driven by variables that relate to self-interest: trade in the case of France, and the adherence to the “One-China policy” in the case of China. However, China is not a purely selfish donor. As most Western donors, China commits more aid to poorer countries. Furthermore, we find no evidence that commercial interests, such as trade or access to natural resources, determine Chinese aid allocation. This latter result contrasts with Western donors, which allocate more aid to their trade partners. France and the UK also commit significantly more aid to their former colonies. In conclusion, the claim that China’s aid allocation is different must be qualified.