

Power Sharing Provisions and Long-Term Success of Mediation in Internal Conflicts

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Abstract

Past studies regarding the success of conflict mediation efforts in civil wars have demonstrated that mediation is a useful conflict mediation mechanism because it facilitates the conclusion of peace agreements. However, even though mediation takes place and peace agreements are signed, the conditions for a durable peace do not always take hold. There have been fewer studies investigating long-term mediation success and this article tries to fill this gap. To this end, we synthesize the mediation literature with recent studies on the durability of peace agreements. In line with research on the quality of agreements, we test the impact of power-sharing arrangements on the chance of long-term mediation success using the new Civil War Mediation (CWM) as well as the UCDP Peace Agreement datasets. Probit regression models provide strong support for the impact of power sharing provisions on long-term mediation success. However, third-party external guarantees in peace agreements, which are important for the implementation of peace agreements, do not guarantee enduring peace. We also find that factors that affect the probability of signing of a peace agreement, such as type of mediator or mediation strategy, do not affect whether the successfully mediated peace agreement will bring lasting peace after the conclusion of an agreement. Additionally, the type of dispute (territorial vs. governmental) seem not to play an important role in affecting the durability of peace while war duration and the breaking of peace agreement negatively affects the chances the peace will last.

Introduction

It is commonly accepted in the literature that mediation is "a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law" (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 8). Civil war researchers have investigated in this vein whether this third-party intervention is a promising avenue to manage or terminate civil wars.

When analyzing the success of mediation attempts scholars tend to focus on whether or not mediators were able to convince the conflict parties to sign a peace agreement. However, little attention has been paid to mediation that inhibits or facilitates long-term peace. This article aims to fill this gap.

Defining mediation success based on whether mediation leads to the conclusion of an agreement or not, empirical studies show that mediation is a useful conflict management mechanism in both intrastate and international conflict (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Bercovitch et al. 1991; Frazier and Dixon 2006; Kleiboer 1996; Regan and Aydin 2006; Quinn et al. 2006; Rauchhaus 2006; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003). However, these studies often find that mediation can be effective in concluding peace agreements under certain conditions only. Mediation outcomes accordingly depend on the identity of a mediator, the strategies, skills, and beliefs of the mediator, previous mediation attempts as well as the relationship between a mediator and the warring parties (see Bercovitch and Houston 1993; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Crescenzi et al. 2008; Regan 1996; Svensson 2007a and 2007b).

The clear benefit of mediation is that it enables the actors to reach a formal agreement. It is believed that peace that beings with a formal peace settlement may be more stable than an informal truce. Some success-stories mentioned by scholars that can serve as examples include mediation efforts of the African Union during the Comorian civil war that led to the conclusion of a peace agreement in 2003 (see Krienbuehl 2010; Mehler 2008), efforts of a non-governmental organization like the Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in the Indonesian civil war that motivated the conflict parties to sign a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005 (see DeRouen et al. 2010), or the ECOWAS engagement into the conflict in Liberia that ended the conflict with the conclusion of the Accra Agreement in 2003 (Dupuy and Detzel 2007; Jarstad 2009; Mehler 2009;).

Whereas the above-mentioned mediated peace agreements were not only able to terminate wars in the short run but also to bring durable peace, in some cases the mediated agreements do not prevent the recurrence to conflict. For example, three Angolan peace agreements mediated by the UN and Portugal—Gbadolite Accord (1989), Bicesse Accords (1991), and Lusaka Protocol (1994)—failed to pacify the African state (see Spears 2000 and 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Similarly, some agreements in Chad, Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Mali were not able to secure peace in the long term (see DeRouen et al. 2010; Dupuy and Binningsbø 2008; Lemarchand 2006; McCoy 2008; Mehler 2008; Spears 2000; Traniello 2008). This raises the question of why some successfully mediated peace settlements fail to appease post-conflict societies in the long run, while others are also respected several years after their conclusion.

. Studies that analyze the long term impact of mediation are scarce and often ambiguous about the extent to which this conflict management technique helps to secure peace after a conflict. Werner (1999) shows that mediation has no impact on the duration of peace after war. The recent study by Beardsley (2008), however, demonstrates a strong support for a positive short-term impact of mediation through the conclusion of formal agreements and through a reduced risk of conflict recurrence during the first few years after the crisis. Nevertheless, he also finds that in the long run mediated conflict are more likely to experience the cessation of peace than non-mediated ones.

One of the key difficulties in this area is the definition and measurement of mediation success. If scholars only define it in terms of whether the agreement between warring parties is achieved or not, they fail to consider the long-term impact of mediation, which is whether mediation renders peace durable. As Beardsley (2008, 724) notes, “while (...) mediation's benefits should primarily be associated with short-term behavior, we would actually miss an important dynamic by not considering the long impact of mediation.” Klieboer (1996) argues that defining mediation success only in terms of achieving a short-term peace agreement is highly unsatisfactory. Similarly, Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) contend that although mediation outcomes may seem to provide short-term success, it also is important to investigate conditions under which mediation can lead to a more enduring settlement of the war.

This article investigates conditions of long-term mediation success in internal conflict. It should be noted that the purpose of this study is not to resolve whether the risk of recurring conflict is lower if a mediator intervenes in the conflict, but rather to investigate under which circumstances the mediated peace agreements lead to a durable peace. The answer to this question will contribute to a better understanding of the impact of third-party interventions and whether we need to differentiate between the short-term and the long-term determinants of peace. Similar to Bercovitch and Simpson's (2010, 79) "contingency model of mediation," our analysis considers not only the variables that influence whether or not mediated peace settlements are reached, but also the factors that are important in determining the durability of agreements, such as the nature of the conflict, the type of mediation chosen, the strategy pursued by the third party, conflict environment, the provisions included in peace agreement, and possible international security guarantees. It should be noted that studies that aim to establish whether mediation has a positive or negative impact on the duration of peace agreements fail to analyze both the impact of variables determining short-term mediation or/and factors influencing the durability of peace (such as the content of mediated peace agreements) (Fortna 2003; Gurses et al. 2008; Quinn et al. 2007; Werner 1999). We believe that comprehensive provisions for power-sharing in mediated peace agreements translate into the success of mediation in the long term, and the findings support our argument.

In the next section, we review some major findings in the mediation literature as well in studies on the duration of peace agreement. We will take a special look at recent studies on the impact of power sharing provisions on the feasibility of lasting peace. The third section will present research design and some descriptive statistics which will be followed by the results from empirical test using probit models. The final section concludes the paper.

Success of Mediation as Third-Party Involvement in Civil Conflicts

Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) and many others note that we can differentiate mediated crises both according to their short-term and long-term success. A short-term success only relates to the signing of a peace agreement, whereas a long-term definition of success also considers the duration of peace following the conclusion of such a treaty. Since we are interested in long-term success of mediation, we need to discuss the literature on mediation success as well as the duration of peace agreements. Below we review these studies, and present our model of long-term success of mediation which builds on the key findings in recent research.

Factors Affecting Short-term Success of Mediation

The question which factors render mediation successful has occupied a fairly large number of scholars. Kleiboer (1996, 360) speaks in this regard of the quest for a "golden formula" (Kleiboer 1996, 360). This search had identified a number of correlates of mediation success, which are commonly attributed to two categories: (a) mediator characteristics and (b) the strategies used during mediation (see Bercovitch and DeRouen 2005; Frazier and Dixon 2006; Quinn et al. 2006; Rauchhaus 2006).

The literature differentiates along many dimension the features of a mediator that affect the effectiveness of its conflict management. Hence, scholars distinguish whether a mediator acted alone or in a team, whether the mediation attempt represented organizations or states, whether the organizations involved were governmental or not, whether the scope of the organization's activities is regional or global and how resourceful state mediator are. However, the literature comes up with very mixed findings. In general, powerful states and IGOs dominate international conflict management in terms of frequency (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, 162). DeRouen (2003, 251-260), for example,

proposes that mediation carried out by the United Nations (UN) can contribute to mediation success in ethnic civil conflicts. He supports this argument by showing that the UN is more likely to take action in crises that are characterized by extraordinary violence. Frazier and Dixon (2006, 401) also suggest that IGOs are best at securing a negotiated settlement, since multilateral actors not only provide legitimacy but also are more likely to create an environment conducive to conflict resolution.

On the other hand, authors like Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005, 108) or Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 791) do not establish positive effects for UN mediation. Kleiboer (1996, 372) argues, conversely, that a status like the one held by the UN is an important cause of mediation success. Bercovitch and Houston (1993, 317) nevertheless point out that one has to be cautious about expecting UN representatives to handle and manage too many complex disputes. In another contribution, Bercovitch and Houston (1996, 27) trace the United Nation's a fairly poor mediation record to selection effects as the organization is only stepping into conflicts that are already very hard to resolve. The authors suggest that regional organizations sharing common ideals and interests offer the best chance for successful mediation, followed by leaders and representatives of small governments, while leaders and representatives of large states as well as international organizations fare worse than expected (*ibid.*). Bercovitch and Houston (1993, 317) conclude in a similar vein that mediation works best when "parties and mediator share some bonds and are part of a recognizable network of interdependence."

Another crucial mediator characteristic that may improve the prospect of successful conflict management is leverage (Kleiboer 1996, 371, Bercovitch et al. 1991, and Touval 1992). Svensson (2007b, 229) finds that although all types of mediators have a positive effect in terms of reaching agreements, powerful mediators outperform "pure mediators", which include representatives of IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, small and distant states as well as private individuals. On the other hand, Slim (1992) argues that less powerful mediators and smaller states such as Algeria, Switzerland, and Austria seem to be more effective because of their strategic weakness. Relatively weak states can be successful in mediation efforts since they are unable to credibly threaten either of the adversaries with the possibility of punitive action (Frazier and Dixon 2006: 390-391). Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005, 108) support this result and argue that superpower mediation decreases the chance for success.

A variety of strategies are employed by mediators in their effort to resolve international conflicts (Savun 2008, 27). Bercovitch et al. (1991) develop the commonly employed typology that categorizes mediation strategies into the following three groups: (1) communication facilitation strategies, (2) procedural strategies, and (3) directive strategies.¹ They define mediation strategy as *communication facilitation* when mediator behavior at the low end of the intervention spectrum. Here a mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role, channeling information to the parties, facilitating cooperation, but exhibiting little control over the more formal process of mediation. A *procedural strategy*, however, enables a mediator to bring both parties together, in some neutral environment, where the conflict manager exerts some control over the conflict management process. The mediator discretion might pertain to the timing, the issues on the agenda, the meeting place and arrangements, media publicity, the distribution of information, and the formality or flexibility in which the tripartite negotiations are conducted. Finally, the authors define a *directive strategy* as the most powerful form of intervention. Here a mediator works to shape the content and nature of a final outcome. This is done by offering each party in conflict incentives, promises of support, or threats of diplomatic sanctions.

Even though there is a growing literature on the relationship between mediation style and conflict resolution (see Rauchhaus 2006; Quinn et al. 2006; Bercovitch and DeRouen 2005), no

¹ Beardsley et al. (2006, 66) provide a more recent typology of mediation styles that draws upon Bercovitch's work; they categorize mediation strategies as follows: (1) facilitation, (2) formulation and (3) manipulation. Other scholars (Dixon 1996; Fisher and Keashly 1988), however, disagree with such encompassing definition of mediations claiming that facilitation is distinct from mediation.

consensus exists among scholars about the kind of mediation strategy that presumably works best. It is frequently argued that directive strategies “help parties to save face, equalize power imbalances, and generally move the disputants toward a more cooperative orientation” (Bercovitch and Houston 1993, 304). Smith and Stam’s (2003, 128) further add that mediators cannot succeed by only acting as an information provider.

Some scholars contend that the key to mediation success is highly context dependent. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) and Dixon (1996) argue for instance that whereas directive strategies seem to be effective in high-intensity conflicts where outcomes are unlikely to occur without a “shove”, these aggressive directive strategies are much less effective in lower-intensity disputes (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006, 350). Beardsley et al. (2006, 81) also emphasize the importance of a balanced mediation strategy. They suggest that facilitative strategies are the best possible answer to commitment problems and post-crisis tensions, while more intrusive forms of mediation seem to be redundant in contributing to conflict resolution (Beardsley et al. 2006, 83). Beardsley et al. (2006) further argue that “manipulative mediation often makes a positive contribution by more effectively securing formal agreements and achieving overall crisis abatement than all other mediation styles” (Beardsley et al. 2006, 83). These results contradict the findings of a number of studies (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004; Bercovitch and Houston 1993; Bercovitch and Wells 1993; Bercovitch et al. 1991) that offer evidence that the use of directive strategies is more successful.

Although the literature concerning the conclusion of mediated peace agreements suggests several factors that can improve the outcome of mediation in the short term, such as conflict attributes, the relationship between the mediator and the warring parties, previous mediation attempts and the like, the mediator’s profile and its behavior are the most common and important variables determining the success of mediation. However, it should be noticed that these variables are not able to explain why successfully mediated peace settlements are not able to bring about a durable peace (Bercovitch and Simpson 2010) . Therefore, we find it instructive to look into studies that analyze why some peace settlements fail to pacify societies in the long term.

Duration of Peace after Civil Conflicts

Recent studies by DeRouen et al. (2009), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), Jarstad and Nilsson (2008), Mattes and Savun (2009), Mukherjee (2006), Stedman (1997 and 2002), and Walter (2002 and 2003) draw attention to the question of the duration, and not simply the signing, of peace agreements. The signing of political agreements represents consent on some thorny issues. Nevertheless because some agreements do prevent the recurrence to conflict and other do not, scholars find it important to take a closer look at the provisions included in those agreements such as (1) external guarantees or (2) power sharing considerations. These stipulations may explain why some pacts are broken and others survive.

It may be argued that the most important factor for a successful implementation of peace agreements, and thus durable peace, seems to be the deployment of third party or multilateral guarantors monitoring the peace process. This allegedly facilitates the flow of information, prevents the former warring parties from cheating, fosters transparency, and coerces the adversaries into the compliance with the terms of the treaty (Walter 2002). Studying three civil conflicts (Angola, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone), Bercovitch and Simpson (2009) find that lack of any external enforcement mechanisms contributed to the failure of peace agreements and thus lasting peace. Sriram (2008, 15) even argues that third party guarantors are more important than power-sharing provisions in peace agreements. Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are one of the most common types of external guarantees included in peace agreements (PKO). However, the results regarding the impact of PKO are mixed. On the one hand, many scholars argue that peacekeeping operations lengthen the spells of peace after an

armed conflict. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) for example find that peace keeping operations conducted by the United Nations improve the prospects for peace if the PKO is adequately designed (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 795).² Hartzell et al. (2001), moreover, suggest that peace keeping missions significantly increase the duration of peace. Hartzell and Hoodie (2003, 327–328) show that the presence of third party enforcers decreases the risk of a civil war recurrence. Similarly, Quinn (2007) finds that an agreement implanted with the help of peacekeeping forces will not only end the war sooner but establish a peace that is more likely to last. Fortna (2004) similarly evaluates whether international interventions are conducive to stabilize peace in a post-civil war setting if one consider the non-random selection of peacekeeping missions. Her results suggest that “intervention by the international community helps maintain peace” (Fortna 2004, 288).

Several scholars are much more skeptical. Regan (2002, 71) shows that outside intervention, if not biased in either direction, increases rather than decreases conflict duration. Similarly, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) find strong statistical evidence that external interventions prolong civil wars (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, 637-638). Furthermore, Dubey (2002) evaluating the effect of PKO by drawing on Doyle and Sambanis’ (2000) dataset, does not find a statistically significant effect on the duration of peace. Mukherjee (2006, 428), using an original dataset of peace spells after civil wars, evaluates the effect of third party enforcement in a survival analysis. His findings challenge the conventional wisdom that UN enforcement is conducive to sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil war.

The establishment of external commissions to oversee the implementation phase may serve as another form of external enforcement. The external commissions can perform many functions—to monitor disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the restructuring process, to oversee governance reform, or to carry out the elections and work on electoral reform (see Dupuy and Detzel 2007).

Studies on the duration of peace agreements have devoted special attention to power sharing provisions in peace agreements. The concept of political power-sharing, which is closely associated with the notion of consociationalism, is identified in Lijphart’s (1977) pioneering work. The centerpiece of power-sharing, as defined by him, is the grand coalition; this implies that power is shared at the level of the central government. Other features of consociationalism include the establishment of a mutual veto, proportional representation that yields minorities a chance of political representation, and segmental autonomy or federalism.

Many external negotiators tend consider power-sharing as a good mechanism for keeping heterogeneous countries peaceful (Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008) or for pacifying post-conflict societies (see Mehler 2009). Since groups engaged into conflict are granted a share of power and access to state resources, disputants should have less to fight about. However, scholars find very mixed results. Some scholars have established that political power-sharing between governments and insurgents lowers the risk of war in diverse societies (Horowitz 2008; O’Leary 2005; Sisk 1996; Wimmer et al. 2004). Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008), for example, find that participation of minorities in federal or regional government might help to pacify ethnically diverse societies in general. Lustick et al. (2004, 209), however, find that power sharing can be more effective in reducing the threat of secession than repression, but it also tends to encourage larger minorities to form “identitarian movements.” Various other reasons may explain the instability of power-sharing governments—difficulties of holding the

² Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and also Sambanis (2008) use their metaphor of the “Peacebuilding Triangle” to explain the varying durability of post-conflict arrangements and accordingly propose that three factors affect the effectiveness of peacebuilding: 1) the level of hostility prevalent at the beginning of the peace process; 2) local capacities for reconstruction and socioeconomic development, which decisively affect the opportunity costs for returning to war, and 3) international capacities for peacebuilding.

coalition together, further sectional interests, rebels may feel that they can achieve less in cooperative arrangement, and the like. Others acknowledge that while power-sharing plays an important role in the transition from armed conflict, such arrangements might not necessarily help maintaining post-conflict stability or democracy (Adekanye 1998; Binningsbø and Kendra 2009; Norris 2008; Vandeginste 2009). Jarstad (2008), Roeder and Rothchild (2005) and Spears (2000) argue that power-sharing institutions are strongly required in the transition to democracy, but that they only play a minor role at the consolidation stage of this process. Finally, others find that power-sharing may have a positive impact on peace duration and democratization in the long term under certain conditions. Mukherjee (2006), for example, in analyzing why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars in some cases, but not others, finds that insurgents have incentives to accept the political power-sharing agreement and not revert to fighting after a decisive military victory.

Because post conflict societies face exceptional difficulties and because Lijphart did not refer in his power-sharing model to such constellations at all, scholars have expanded the concept to include other pacifying institutions. Power-sharing provisions are broadly defined to include “rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 320). The main goal of power-sharing provisions included in peace agreements is to ensure that none of the parties has a dominant position over another, which in turn will help minimize the danger of war recurrence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 2002). This implies that the power sharing model is not limited to political division of power only.

Scholars tend to divide power-sharing strategies in terms of three or four dimensions: political, territorial, military, and economic (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; DeRouen et al. 2009; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Svensson 2009). There is much evidence that power sharing can facilitate peace after civil wars, but scholars disagree which provision plays an important role. Mattes and Savun (2009) have shown that peace is more durable when there are signed political power-sharing pacts. Mukherjee (2006), though, shows that political power sharing arrangements are less effective after military stalemates. Walter (2002) finds that territorial and political power-sharing pacts increase the likelihood that a peace agreement is both signed and implemented. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) and DeRouen et al. (2009) demonstrate that military and territorial power sharing increase the duration of such agreements. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), however, stress that multiple power-sharing provisions in settlements play an important role in the durability of peace. Scholars dispute which dimension is more important for the duration of peace agreements, but tend to agree that the complexity of the agreements matters. Therefore, we argue that comprehensiveness of such agreements is more important than establishing which provisions work better for the success mediated peace agreements:

H1: Long-term mediation success in the form of lasting peace become more likely if the mediated peace agreement includes extensive power sharing provisions

In our analysis we want to understand what makes mediated agreements lasting. We contend that power-sharing provisions are the major factor, but we place this argument in a broader context since the literature convincingly shows that a host of other factors possibly affect the durability of peace. Our empirical analysis therefore controls for the possible impact of i) the nature of the conflict; ii) the nature of mediator; iii) the mediator’s behavior; iv) the type of mediated peace agreements (provisions for power-sharing and external enforcements); v) the conflict environment and this regard the presence of peace spoilers.

With respect to the nature of the conflict, scholars find that duration of the conflict itself matters for the peace duration afterwards (Hartzell et al. 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mukherjee

2006; Svensson 2009). Also, the type of incompatibility is important. Scholars differentiate between territorial and governmental types of incompatibility. Governmental conflicts concern the type of political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition, while territorial conflicts are secessionist or autonomy-seeking wars. Other work has demonstrated that the most intractable civil wars are those with territorial issues at stake (Walter 2003; Licklider 1995). There is a well-established result suggesting that agreements over territorial issues are more likely to fail (Holsti 1991; Hensel 1994; Huth 1996). Licklider (1995) argues that opposition groups pursue territorial secession from the home state are likely to be more intractable than are wars in which opposition groups pursue goals that do not threaten the territorial integrity of the state (see also Balch-Lindsay and Enterline. 2000, 625). Whenever an opposition group declares secessionist goals, civil war significantly lasts longer. Territorial wars also are more likely to be mediated (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011). This finding also can be linked to the fact that civil wars fought over territory last longer and have shorter peace spells, because when chances for a durable peace are unclear, warring parties may be more willing to use a mediation as a conflict management tool (Fearon 2004).

Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) point out that overall environment in which conflict takes place matters for peace duration. More particularly, the greater the presence and strength of spoilers— parties that are keen to uphold or destroy an agreement— is, the smaller the chance of reaching peace agreement and of these treaties to last. Scholars argue that some leaders and parties may believe that peace can threaten their power and interests and thus use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it (Cronin 2010; Kydd and Walter 2002 and 2006; Stedman 1997).

Research Design

This section describes the variables and introduces the indicators that are used to test our argument on the peace fostering impact of power sharing provisions. The main sources for the empirical analysis are the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement (version 1.0) and the Civil War Mediation (CWM) datasets. For some additional information we consulted the UCDP Termination Dataset.

The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset contains data on all peace agreements signed between the warring parties active in an armed conflict from 1989 to 2005 (Harbom et al. 2006). In this dataset, civil war refers to “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”³

The UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset contains detailed information on provisions included in mediated peace agreements that can be grouped into four categories⁴:

- 1) “the regulation of the violent behavior of the parties” (e.g. provisions for a ceasefire or the cessation of hostilities; the creation of a new national army or the integration of rebels into the army; DDR; withdrawal of foreign forces)
- 2) “the regulation of governmental incompatibility” (e.g. the right for the rebel group to transform into a political party; the integration of rebels into the government or civil service; elections or stipulated electoral reforms; national talks to solve incompatibility; provisions for extensive power-sharing in new government),

³ UCDP definitions available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions>

⁴ For specification and operationalization of peace agreement variables see http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55064_UCDP_Peace_Agreement_Dataset_Codebook.pdf

- 3) “regulation of territorial incompatibility” (whether the agreement called for a federal state solution or maybe granted the disputed region autonomy, local governance or an independence; whether the agreement provided for the holding of a referendum on the future status of the disputed region; the agreement granted the disputed region power-sharing in the local government; the agreement granted the disputed region provided for extended cultural freedoms; provided for demarcation of the border and the like).
- 4) other issues, such as whether the provided for an amnesty and the release of prisoners; whether included the concept of National Reconciliation; reaffirmed earlier agreements; provided for the return of refugees; outlined a negotiating agenda including negotiations on the incompatibility; provided for the deployment of a peace-keeping operation and for the establishment of a commission or committee to oversee

Information on mediation comes from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (1946-2004) which is the first resource to focus solely on civil war mediation (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011). It should be noted that most extant research on the mediation of violent conflicts uses Bercovitch’s International Conflict Management (ICM) data (1999), the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset by Wilkenfeld et al.’s (2003) or Regan et al.’s (2009) data collections. It should be noted that the ICM dataset focuses on civil and interstate wars, the ICB dataset focuses on international crises and that the Regan et al. (2009) dataset treats mediation as only one aspect of non-military interventions and omits smaller civil wars with a fatality threshold below 200.. The CWM dataset contains variables describing mediation incidences for all civil war episodes in the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.

It should be noted that, as CWM demonstrates, sometimes one civil war episode can have multiple mediation efforts. These incidences can be undertaken just by one mediator, but also by multiple mediators. It happens that each mediation effort undertaken by one mediation led to the conclusion of peace agreements—for example in the civil conflict between El Salvadoran government and FMLN-rebels (10/1/1979-12/31/1991), mediation efforts undertaken by UN Sec Gen Pérez de Cuéllar between 9/16/1991 and 9/25/1991 led to the conclusion of two peace agreements: the New York Agreement (1991/09/25) and the Compressed Negotiations (1991/09/25). His later efforts between 12/28/1991 and 12/31/1991 culminated in the New York Act (1991/12/31). Similar examples can be found for the internal conflict between the Sudanese government and SPLM.

As a result of matching data from these three datasets, we constructed a dataset that contains 108 mediated peace agreements between 1989 and 2004. It contains general peace agreement variables as well as variables defining a particular conflict (type of incompatibility, the start and end dates of a conflict, and the involved parties) and describing mediation efforts (mediation start and end dates, the identity of mediators, and mediation strategy).

It should be noted that almost 70% of these mediated peace agreements ended conflicts in which there was no clear winner, and only 11% of mediated peace agreements were concluded after the victory of one of the parties.

Dependent Variable and Estimation Method

Using one of the termination variables from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, our dependent variable *Long-term Mediation Failure* is coded as 1 if the mediated efforts led to the conclusion of peace agreements but violence with the same parties restarted within five years, 0 otherwise. Exactly half of mediated peace agreements failed to bring lasting peace and the violence recurred, as the summary

statistics listed in Table 1 show. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, in the empirical test of the framework, we employ probit models.

Operationalization of Independent Variables

Following the previous studies of duration of peace after conflict (Derouen et al. 2009; Gent 2011; Mukherjee 2006; Mattes and Savun 2009; Hartzell and Hoodie 2007; Svensson 2009) we use two general measures of power sharing—the presence of any power-sharing provisions in peace agreements, and power sharing comprehensiveness of the agreements—as well as the different types of power sharing (political, territorial, military):

Any Power sharing. This dummy variable is coded as 1 if the agreement specifies at least one type of power-sharing dimension (political or military or territorial), 0 otherwise.

Power Sharing Comprehensiveness. We treat peace agreement as comprehensive if at least two power-sharing dimensions are specified in the agreement (1) and as non-comprehensive if agreement specifies only one or none power-sharing dimensions (0).

Political Power Sharing. This is a dichotomous variable measured 1 if the agreement included at least one of the following: integration of rebels into government or civil service; rebel Integration into the interim government; and power-sharing in new government, 0 otherwise.

Territorial Power Sharing. We used the category 1 if a peace agreement mentioned at least one of the following: Autonomy (granted the disputed region autonomy), Federation (provided for a federal state solution); Independence; Referendum (the agreement provided for the holding of a referendum on the future status of the disputed region; Local Power Sharing (granted the disputed region power-sharing in the local government; Local self-government (granted the disputed region local governance); or Demarcation of the border, 0 otherwise.

Military Power Sharing. The variable is coded as 1 if the agreement provided for the creation of a new national army or the integration of rebels into the army, and 0 otherwise.

Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Independent Variables

Variable		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Any Power sharing	0	33	30.56	30.56
	1	75	69.44	100.00
	Total	108	100.00	
Power Sharing Comprehensiveness	0	72	66.67	66.67
	1	36	33.33	100.00
	Total	108	100.00	
Military Power Sharing	0	76	70.37	70.37
	1	32	29.63	100.00
	Total	108	100.00	
Political Power Sharing	0	65	60.19	60.19
	1	43	39.81	100.00
	Total	108	100.00	
Territorial Power Sharing	0	73	67.59	67.59
	1	35	32.41	100.00
	Total	108	100.00	

Control Factors

Mediator's Profile. Since powerful states and IGOs dominate international conflict management in terms of frequency (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, 162), we found it important to include dummy variables that summarize these two identity features.

Directive Mediation Strategy. We borrow Bercovitch et al.'s (1991) typology of mediation strategies, which has also been used in the civil war mediation dataset. Following the number of studies showing that the use of directive strategies is more successful (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004, Bercovitch and Houston 1993, Bercovitch and Wells 1993, Bercovitch et al. 1991), we expect to find a negative impact of the directive strategy variable (coded 1 or 0) on the risk of mediation failure.

War Duration. The longer the conflict lasts, the more destructive it usually becomes, bearing devastating financial costs and causing severe moral and physical harm. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the intractable conflict negatively affects the likelihood of reaching peace agreements as well as the chance of these treaties to last.⁵ Using the episode start and end date from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Termination dataset we calculated the number of days the war lasted. For ongoing wars, duration of conflicts is based on end of dataset, i.e. 12/31/2004.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Taking into account the above summarized findings we would like to test whether the chance of a durable peace after signing mediated peace agreements increases when external guarantees provisions are included in these agreements. As discussed above, the PKO variable is frequently used to measure the impact of external guarantees on the durability of peace after signing peace agreements (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Hartzell et al. 2001; Mukherjee 2006). We use a binary variable to gauge the effect Peace Keeping Operation deployment. It measures 1 when agreement provided for the deployment of a peace-keeping operation, and 0 when the agreement did not.

Commission or committee to oversee implementation is measured as 1 when the agreement provided for the establishment of a commission or committee to oversee the implementation of the agreement, 0 otherwise.

Peace Spoilers. Until now, there is no quantitative dataset that is able to capture the concept of spoilers. Wucherpfennig (2011), for example, conceptualizes spoiler dynamics as "competition between rebel factions". Since terror acts are used at times to destroy ongoing peace negotiations, we operationalize "spoils" as the number of terror acts committed by rebels in the period when mediation attempts were taking place. We use the log of the number of terror acts because of outliers in the measure. Data on terror acts come from the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

Territorial Wars is coded as 1 if the war concerns autonomy or secessionist claims and 0 otherwise. Scholars find that territorial wars last longer, are intractable and are more likely to recur than wars over government control; they also are less likely to end with peace agreements and those signed agreements are more likely to fail (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008; Holsti 1991; Huth 1996; Walter 2003). Because of the complex nature of territorial wars, it is reasonable to expect that territorial wars will increase the risk of long-term mediation failure. On the hand, it should be acknowledged that territorial wars are more likely to be mediated than governmental wars.

Peace Agreements Ended. The peace agreement is no longer considered to be fully implemented if the validity of this document is contested by one or more of the signatories. If a party officially withdraws from an agreement, the treaty cannot, according to the UCDP definition, survive and therefore is considered to have ended. This is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the agreement was broken or otherwise (1 or 0). Table A1 in the Appendix contains information on which mediated civil

⁵ For a more in-depth discussion on the definition and meaning of the term intractable conflict, see Kriesberg 2005; Coleman 2000; Crocker et al. 2004; Putnam and Wondolleck 2003.

war peace agreements ended and which were followed by violence within 5 years from the conclusion of the agreement (failure of long-term impact of mediation). One can observe a positive correlation between PA end and Mediation Failure. In 44% of the cases the survival of peace agreements is associated with long-term mediation success, and in 25% of the cases the end of the peace agreement meant recurrence to war with the same parties within a period of five years. However, we should also note that in 6% of cases the official withdrawal of a party from a peace agreement did not lead to a conflict renewal. Also, in 25% of cases a dispute recurred although the agreement did not officially fail.

Given a unique relationship between territorial wars and the end of peace agreements, as discussed above, we find it important to estimate the interaction term to infer how the effect of broken peace agreements on mediation failure in the long run depends on the type of civil conflict. For this purpose we created an interaction term between the incidence of territorial wars measure and the PA end variable. The new variable is coded as 1 for territorial wars with broken peace agreements. 0 otherwise.

Empirical Analysis

This section introduces the results of our inquiry into the determinants of long-term mediation success. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimated probit models. Table 2 presents the main results in a stepwise fashion as we organize the results for the power-sharing variables separately. The likelihood ratio chi-squares shows that all models are statistically significant. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the post-conflict countries under examination.

The analysis demonstrates the relationship between power sharing and the chance of mediation success in the long-term. Four of the independent variables are found to significantly influence the duration of peace. We find support for the hypothesis that a post-conflict society is less likely to fall victim to a new civil war during the first five years since the fighting in the last armed conflict ended if a peace agreement included at least two types of power sharing provisions (Models 1-3). There are a number of examples of mediated peace agreements with comprehensive power sharing provisions that led to durable peace; these treaties include the Washington Agreement concluded between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Republic of Herzegovina-Bosnia on March 18, 1994 as well as the Dayton Agreement signed on December 14, 1995 that put an end to the long Bosnian war.⁶ The Washington agreement included all three dimensions of power sharing—it provided for the integration of rebels into the army (military power sharing), included provisions for extensive power-sharing in the new government (political power sharing), and called for the division of the territory that was combated into autonomous cantons, establishing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (territorial power sharing). Under the Dayton Agreement, two power sharing dimensions were included: political—the political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina was agreed upon (with the first elections scheduled for 1996), and territorial—specifications were given regarding the creation of the State of Bosnia Herzegovina as a confederation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republika Srpska.

We also find that some form of power sharing included in mediated peace agreements decreases the risk of mediation failure (Model 4 and 5). Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the inclusion of political or territorial power sharing provisions positively affects the likelihood that peace agreement will bring long-lasting peace (Models 6-11). Examples of the former are the two agreements signed between the government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1997. Although the Moscow Declaration signed on June 27, 1997 officially ended the civil war in Tajikistan, these agreements regulated very important political issues without which the lasting peace in Tajikistan could

⁶ Cousens (2002), Greenberg and Guinness (2000), Holdbrooke (1999), and Touval (2002) provide more information on these agreements.

be less feasible. They called for the establishment of a Commission on National Reconciliation consisting of the members coming from the government and UTO, and for the incorporation of representatives of the UTO into the structures of the executive branch, including ministries, departments, local government bodies as well as of the judicial branch.⁷ In case of the mediated peace agreements with the inclusion of territorial power sharing provisions only, a good illustration is “Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria” signed in Moscow on May 8, 1997. Although there was a ceasefire declared on 21 July 1992 the real breakthrough in conflict prevention became visible in 1997 with the conclusion of the memorandum (see Neukirch 2001, Vorkunova 2001). However, in case of military power sharing variable, whereas it would indicate the desirable impact on mediation failure, we find that this impact is insignificant (Model 12). Model 13, which includes all three types of power sharing demonstrates that territorial power sharing has dominant role in affecting the likelihood whether mediated peace agreement lasts and brings long peace.

As for other provisions included in the peace agreements, we obtained mixed results across the different specifications. The establishment of external guarantees in form of peace keeping operations after the conclusion of peace agreements seems not to play important role for the peace to last. In most cases PKO increases the risk of mediation failure, and only in Model 11, which tests the impact of territorial power provisions, PKO increases the chance for peace to last. The impact of a commission to supervise implementation of peace agreements is not significant, but the sign of coefficient suggests the positive relationship with mediation success.

We find that factors related to mediation efforts, such as the type of mediator and the strategy the conflict manager chose do not determine whether the mediated peace agreement will last and bring about durable peace. These results suggest that mediator attributes can have positive short term effects as the relationship between mediator type and the chance of peace agreement illustrates. However, these factors do no longer play such a positive role once the time horizon is widened to the half decade after the end of the war. The sign of IGOs as a mediator remains consistent across different specifications and indicates a negative relationship. However the sign of the variable which measure whether or not a powerful state acted as a mediator is positive in almost all models except Model 1. Similarly, whereas the mediators’ directive strategies in the form of incentives, or threats of diplomatic sanctions may increase the chance that the warring parties sign a peace agreement, they do not significantly affect the chance for peace to last. Note that the sign of coefficient in almost all models, but Models 1 and 13, suggests the negative relationship between directive strategies and mediation failure in the long term.

⁷ The full text of the peace agreements concluded between the government of Tajikistan and UTO in 1997 is available at the Conciliation Resources’ website <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/key-texts.php>

Table 2. Probit Analysis (Dependent Variable: Long-term Mediation Failure)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PA ended	2.140*** (0.474)	2.181*** (0.487)	2.144*** (0.468)	2.060*** (0.451)	2.106*** (0.458)
Territorial War	-0.450 (0.503)	-0.421 (0.467)	-0.447 (0.496)	-0.288 (0.432)	-0.249 (0.383)
PA end*Territorial War	-1.502* (0.890)	-1.531* (0.878)	-1.508* (0.884)	-1.930** (0.757)	-1.960*** (0.760)
Directive Strategy	0.001 (0.657)	-0.001 (0.655)	-0.008 (0.644)	-0.017 (0.649)	-0.027 (0.636)
War Duration	0.0006 (0.000)	0.0006 (0.000)	0.0006* (0.000)	0.0008** (0.000)	0.0008** (0.000)
Powerful Mediator	-0.020 (0.488)	0.024 (0.384)	–	0.116 (0.532)	0.176 (0.421)
IGOs mediator	-0.090 (0.388)	–	-0.083 (0.304)	-0.129 (0.426)	–
Military Power sharing	–	–	–	–	–
Political Power sharing	–	–	–	–	–
Territorial Power sharing	–	–	–	–	–
Any Power sharing	–	–	–	-1.136*** (0.408)	-1.124*** (0.393)
PA comprehensiveness	-0.962*** (0.350)	-0.962*** (0.348)	-0.960*** (0.336)	–	–
PKO	0.332 (0.380)	0.349 (0.377)	0.334 (0.382)	0.283 (0.365)	0.299 (0.358)
Commission	-0.265 (0.315)	-0.268 (0.318)	-0.265 (0.315)	-0.310 (0.277)	-0.319 (0.286)
Peace Spoilers (logNterr acts)	0.020 (0.076)	0.016 (0.079)	0.021 (0.073)	-0.062 (0.086)	-0.067 (0.092)
Constant	-0.310 (0.446)	-0.361 (0.346)	-0.318 (0.389)	0.314 (0.587)	0.244 (0.440)
N	107	107	107	107	107
Log-Likelihood	-51.691	-51.718	-51.692	-50.930	-50.983
Wald χ^2	98.35***	67.23***	80.21***	43.19***	41.55***

Cell entries report coefficients. For the interaction-terms, cell entries report marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
PA ended	2.081*** (0.392)	2.133*** (0.410)	2.066*** (0.398)	2.034*** (0.391)	2.043*** (0.399)	1.996*** (0.407)	1.838*** (0.445)	2.186*** (0.394)
Territorial War	-0.552 (0.480)	-0.505 (0.428)	-0.562 (0.465)	0.185 (0.413)	0.194 (0.426)	0.153 (0.485)	-0.489 (0.441)	0.087 (0.529)
PA end*Territorial War	-1.564* (0.831)	-1.594* (0.828)	-1.544* (0.826)	-1.609** (0.801)	-1.617** (0.770)	-1.544** (0.778)	-1.233 (0.956)	-1.913** (0.687)
Directive Strategy	-0.047 (0.665)	-0.057 (0.654)	-0.011 (0.667)	-0.099 (0.633)	-0.100 (0.659)	-0.014 (0.668)	-0.095 (0.598)	0.002 (0.717)
War Duration	0.0005 (0.000)	0.0005 (0.000)	0.0005 (0.000)	0.0008** (0.000)	0.0008** (0.000)	0.0009** (0.000)	0.0006 (0.000)	0.0007* (0.000)
Powerful Mediator	0.075 (0.494)	0.146 (0.400)	–	0.174 (0.538)	0.187 (0.414)	–	0.139 (0.460)	0.090 (0.560)
IGOs mediator	-0.145 (0.393)	–	-1.172 (0.318)	-0.028 (0.455)	–	-0.088 (0.354)	-0.053 (0.361)	-0.084 (0.455)
Military Power sharing	–	–	–	–	–	–	-0.216 (0.263)	-0.263 (0.312)
Political Power sharing	-0.817** (0.380)	-0.800** (0.360)	-0.824** (0.364)	–	–	–	–	-0.628 (0.455)
Territorial Power sharing	–	–	–	-1.158*** (0.427)	-1.159*** (0.425)	-1.153*** (0.422)	–	-1.081** (0.432)
Any Power sharing	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PA comprehensiveness	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PKO	0.320 (0.380)	0.335 (0.382)	0.317 (0.388)	0.006 (0.353)	0.013 (0.331)	-0.007 (0.351)	0.014 (0.348)	0.251 (0.401)
Commission	-0.392 (0.282)	-0.398 (0.288)	-0.393 (0.282)	-0.357 (0.316)	-0.359 (0.326)	-0.356 (0.316)	-0.363 (0.249)	-0.232 (0.247)
Peace Spoilers (logNterr acts)	0.032 (0.080)	0.026 (0.084)	0.030 (0.076)	0.036 (0.069)	0.035 (0.075)	0.034 (0.066)	0.049 (0.070)	-0.003 (0.075)
Constant	-0.181 (0.502)	-0.263 (0.401)	-0.154 (0.430)	-0.596 (0.501)	-0.610 (0.361)	-0.544 (0.430)	-0.509 (0.451)	-0.155 (0.621)
N	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107
Log-Likelihood	-52.452	-52.521	-52.466	-50.497	-50.500	-50.566	-54.352	-48.976
Wald χ^2	102.52***	81.99***	71.64***	41.75***	40.47***	36.23**	41.74***	66.07***

Cell entries report coefficients. For the interaction-terms, cell entries report marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10

Furthermore, the characteristics of the conflict are significant in impacting the duration of peace after civil war. In line with most research, war duration negatively affects the chance that the peace will last after the conclusion of peace agreements (Models 1, 6-10, and 13). Similarly, as expected, withdrawing from the peace agreement increases the risk of a conflict five years after the end of last war.

The type of dispute does not seem to play an important role for the durability of peace. The wars fought over the control of territory do not significantly reduce the risk of mediation failure as compared to government wars. Contrary to expectations, the majority of the models presented exhibit a negative relationship between territorial civil wars and the long-term probability of mediation failure. However, it should be noted that in Model 1 and well as in models testing separately the impact of territorial power sharing on the likelihood of mediation failure in the long term, the relationship between territorial wars and lasting peace is negative (Model 6-8). The interaction effect between the end of peace agreement and territorial type of war variables implies that the break-up of peace agreements after territorial civil wars should not be associated with long-term mediation failure. Additional tests reported in Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix confirm this negative effect.⁸ In model 1 for instance, the mean interaction effect is negative (-0.462) and only for a few cases the interaction effect is positive. In other words, the findings imply that the effect of broken peace agreement does not differ depending on whether territorial type of war is considered (and vice versa).

Finally, we controlled for the impact of peace spoilers as a measure of the conflict environment. We find that acts of violence perpetrated against civilians during the mediation efforts tell us little about the chance of lasting peace once the civil war is over.

Conclusion

The frequent failure of former disputants to respect a peace agreement has nourished the pessimism that treaties are often not much worthier than the paper on which they were written. However, we know relatively little about the long-term success of peace agreement. This article has therefore tried to shed light on the fate of mediate agreements. We show based on a systematic study of the ending of civil wars that agreements which stipulate the sharing of power between the former adversaries are not pure paper tigers. On the contrary, their chance to pacify states for at least five years after the first end of conflict is larger than for other agreements without such provisions.

While mediated peace agreements with political or territorial power-sharing provisions increase the chance of permanent pacification of war-torn societies, military provisions do, however, not exert such a beneficial influence. Similarly to Toft (2009), the results suggest that external guarantees included in mediated peace agreements do not seem to play an important role in the creation of durable peace. However, third-party assistance and security guarantees may still be important for the implementation process and the survival of the peace agreement, but it was not the subject of this paper.

Furthermore, the study demonstrates that territorial wars and the overall duration of war do not undermine the mediation success in the long term. The withdrawal from the peace agreement increases the risk of a conflict five years after the end of last war, but this effect does not depend on the type of civil conflict.

⁸ The Stata command *inteff* computes the correct marginal effect of a change in two interacted variables for a logit or probit model together with the standard errors. The *inteff* command will work if the interacted variables are both continuous variables, if both are dummy variables, or if there is one of each. See Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) for more information.

We also find that some factors that are important for the success of a short-term mediation (signing of a peace agreement) are not significant in determining the long-term success of mediation. The study has demonstrated that characteristics of mediators that facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements seem not affect whether the peace will last or whether war will recur. Reasonably, the strategy used by mediators in order to compel combatants to conclude a peace agreement play little role in determining the durability of peace after the conclusion of such agreements. Also factors related to the environment in which such conflict management efforts occur, measured in this study by the presence of peace spoilers, do not impact the duration of peace.

Note that our data analysis is limited to the post-Cold War era. Although we are thus not able to speculate over the fate of treaties that were concluded before 1989, it should be pointed out that mediation and the conclusion of mediated agreements were far less common during the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Future studies should, in our view, try to study whether the sequencing of mediation attempts makes a difference and whether the mediate conflicts are those which do not matter much for the international community.

In sum, this article is a first step toward a better understanding of conditions of long-term consequences of mediation attempts. We have found that the inclusion of political or territorial power sharing provisions in mediated peace agreements increases the probability of mediation success, but that the withdrawal of one of the parties from the agreement decrease it. The study also shows that type of mediators and their behavior as well as third-party security guarantees do not play important role in determining the mediation success in the long term. We hope that these findings will motivate future studies that will lead to better understanding of long-term mediation success by scholars and practitioners.

Appendix

Table A1. Mediated Civil War Peace Agreements, 1989–2004

Name	Country	Date	Ended	Long-Term Mediation Failure
Islamabad Accord	Afghanistan	1993/03/07	1	1
Jalalabad Agreement	Afghanistan	1993/05/20	0	1
Bicesse Agreement	Angola	1991/05/31	1	1
Lusaka Protocol	Angola	1994/11/20	1	1
Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Intent	Angola	2002/04/04	0	0
Washington Agreement	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	1994/03/01	0	0
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)	1995/12/14	0	0
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"	Cambodia	1991/10/23	0	1
National reconciliation agreement	Chad	1997/10/03	0	0
Tripoli 2 Agreement	Chad	2002/01/07	1	0
Common Agenda for the Path to a New Colombia	Colombia	1999/05/06	0	1
Los Pozos Agreement	Colombia	2001/02/09	0	1

Table 1. (Continued)

Los Pozos Accord	Colombia	2002/01/20	1	1
The Famboni II Agreement	Comoros (Anjouan)	2001/02/17	0	0
Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros	Comoros (Anjouan)	2003/12/20	0	0
Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités	Congo	1999/12/29	0	1
The Erdut Agreement	Croatia (Serb)	1995/11/12	0	0
Lusaka Accord	Democratic Republic of Congo	1999/07/10	1	1
Declaration of Fundamental Principles for the Inter-Congolese dialogue	Democratic Republic of Congo	2001/05/04	0	0
Geneva Agreement	El Salvador	1990/04/04	0	1
General Agenda and Timetable for the Comprehensive Negotiating Process	El Salvador	1990/05/21	0	1
Agreement on Human Rights	El Salvador	1990/07/26	0	1
Mexico Agreements	El Salvador	1991/04/27	0	0
The Compressed Negotiations	El Salvador	1991/09/25	0	0
New York Agreement	El Salvador	1991/09/25	0	0
New York Act	El Salvador	1991/12/31	0	0
New York Act II	El Salvador	1992/01/16	0	0
Chapultepec Peace Agreement	El Salvador	1992/01/16	0	0
Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict	Georgia (Abkhazia)	1994/04/04	0	0
Oslo Accord	Guatemala	1990/03/30	0	1
Mexico Accord	Guatemala	1991/04/26	0	1
Querétaro Agreement	Guatemala	1991/07/25	0	1
Framework Agreement for the Resumption of Negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity	Guatemala	1994/01/10	0	1
Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations on a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala	Guatemala	1994/03/29	0	1
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights	Guatemala	1994/03/29	0	1
Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict	Guatemala	1994/06/17	0	1
Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer	Guatemala	1994/06/23	0	1
Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples	Guatemala	1995/03/31	0	0
Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation	Guatemala	1996/05/06	0	0
Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society	Guatemala	1996/09/19	0	0
Agreement on a Definitive Ceasefire	Guatemala	1996/12/04	0	0
Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace	Guatemala	1996/12/29	0	0
Abuja Peace Agreement	Guinea Bissau	1998/11/01	1	1
Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement	Indonesia (Aceh)	2002/12/09	0	1
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement	Indonesia (Aceh)	2005/08/15	0	1

Table 1. (Continued)

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements/ Oslo Agreement	Israel (Palestine)	1993/09/13	0	0
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area	Israel (Palestine)	1994/05/04	0	0
Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO	Israel (Palestine)	1994/08/29	0	0
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip/ Oslo B	Israel (Palestine)	1995/09/28	0	1
Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron	Israel (Palestine)	1997/01/15	0	1
Wye River Memorandum	Israel (Palestine)	1998/10/23	1	1
Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II	Israel (Palestine)	1999/09/04	0	1
Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords	Ivory Coast	2003/01/23	1	1
Accra II	Ivory Coast	2003/03/07	0	1
Accra III	Ivory Coast	2004/07/30	1	1
Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire	Ivory Coast	2005/04/06	0	-
Banjul III Agreement	Liberia	1990/10/24	0	1
Bamako Ceasefire Agreement	Liberia	1990/11/28	1	1
Banjul IV Agreement	Liberia	1990/12/21	1	1
Lomé Agreement	Liberia	1991/02/13	1	1
Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement	Liberia	1991/10/30	1	1
Cotonou Peace Agreement	Liberia	1993/07/25	1	1
Akosombo Peace Agreement	Liberia	1994/09/12	1	1
Abuja Peace Agreement	Liberia	1995/08/19	1	1
Abuja II Peace Agreement	Liberia	1996/08/17	0	0
Accra Ceasefire Agreement	Liberia	2003/06/17	0	0
Accra Peace Agreement	Liberia	2003/08/18	0	0
Ohrid Agreement	Macedonia	2001/08/13	0	0
Tamanrasset Accord	Mali (Azawad)	1991/01/06	1	0
Pacte National	Mali (Azawad)	1992/04/11	1	0
Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria	Moldova (Dniestr)	1997/05/08	0	0
Protocol on the Agreed Agenda	Mozambique	1991/05/28	0	1
Agreement on Principles of the Electoral Act	Mozambique	1992/03/12	0	0
Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP)	Mozambique	1992/10/04	0	0
Paris Accord	Niger (Air and Azawad)	1993/06/10	1	0
Ouagadougou Accord	Niger (Air and Azawad)	1994/10/09	0	0
Accord e'tablissant une paix définitive entre le gouvernement de la republique du Niger et l'organisation de la résistance armée	Niger (Air and Azawad)	1995/04/15	0	0
Honiara Declaration	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	1991/01/21	1	1
Honiara Commitments to Peace	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	1994/09/03	1	1
Bougainville Peace Agreement	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	2001/08/30	0	0
GRP-RAM/SFP/YOU General Agreement for Peace	Philippines	1995/10/13	0	0
Mindanao Final Agreement	Philippines	1996/09/02	0	0

Table 1. (Continued)

Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front	(Mindanao) Philippines (Mindanao)	2001/06/22	0	0
N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement	Rwanda	1991/03/29	1	1
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law	Rwanda	1992/09/18	1	1
Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government,	Rwanda	1993/01/09	1	1
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons,	Rwanda	1993/06/09	1	1
Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces and The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions	Rwanda	1993/08/03	1	1
Arusha Accords	Rwanda	1993/08/04	1	1
Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du Senegal el le Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)	Senegal (Casamance)	2004/12/30	0	0
Lomé Peace Agreement	Sierra Leone	1999/07/07	1	1
Abuja Ceasefire Agreement	Sierra Leone	2000/11/10	0	0
Addis Ababa Agreement	Somalia	1993/03/27	1	1
Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation	Somalia	1994/03/24	1	1
The Cairo Declaration on Somalia	Somalia	1997/12/22	1	0
Khartoum Agreement	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	1997/04/21	1	0
Machakos Protocol	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	2002/07/20	0	1
Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	2003/09/25	0	1
Framework on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	2004/01/07	0	0
Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	2004/05/26	0	0
Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	2004/05/26	0	0
Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on Power Sharing	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	2004/05/26	0	0
Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	2005/01/09	0	.
Protocol on the Fundamental Principles of Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	Tajikistan	1995/08/17	0	1
Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E.S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik-Opposition, S.A. Huri, on the results of	Tajikistan	1996/12/23	0	0

the meeting held in Moscow 23 December 1996					
Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation	Tajikistan	1997/02/21	0	0	
Protocol on political issues	Tajikistan	1997/05/18	0	0	
Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	Tajikistan	1997/06/27	0	0	
Good Friday Agreement	UK (Northern Ireland)	1998/04/10	0	0	

Table A1. Computing interaction effects using *inteff* command

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ie	107	-.4620446	.2846739	-.852523	.0481708
se	107	.312951	.0623496	.0619313	.419455
z	107	-1.398488	.8388361	-3.598899	.4383606




Figure A1.




Figure A2.

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