EMU CHOICES

THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE SINCE MAASTRICHT
SALZBURG CENTRE OF EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES

CONSORTIUM PARTNERS
UNIVERSITY OF BASEL
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA
CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN
UNIVERSITY OF GRENOBLE
UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ
LUISS 'GUIDO CARLI' ROME
UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG
UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM

The Choice for Europe since Maastricht. Member States' Preferences for Economic and Fiscal Integration - Codebook (Draft)

Hanno Degner and Dirk Leuffen

EMU CHOICES WORKING PAPER SERIES 2016



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 649532

The Choice for Europe since Maastricht. Member States' Preferences for Economic and Fiscal Integration

CODE BOOK (DRAFT)

Authors: **Hanno Degner (Hanno.Degner@uni-konstanz.de)**
Dirk Leuffen (Dirk.Leuffen@uni-konstanz.de)
Date: **2016 – 01 – 15**

Table of Contents

Introduction: Decision-Making in the EU During the Euro Crisis **2**

1. Identification and Selection of Policy Proposals **3**

2. Identification and Selection of the Relevant Policy Issues **5**

3. Definition of Policy Spaces and Coding of Positions Based on Document Analysis **7**

4. Validation and Filling Missing Cells Through Expert Interviews **8**

4.1 Selection of Expert Interview Partners 8

4.2 Validation of Existing Data on Issues, Policy Spaces, and Positions 10

4.3 Completion of Positions in the Dataset 11

4.4 Measuring Salience 11

5. Triangulating Data in View of Constructing a Unified Dataset **12**

Conclusion: The Best of Two Worlds – Combining Document Analysis and Expert Interviews .. **14**

ANNOTATED QUESTIONNAIRE **15**

QUESTIONNAIRE **20**

WORKING SHEET (example) **22**

FRESH SHEET **24**

UNIDIMENSIONAL POLICY SPACE: EXAMPLE **26**

Literature **27**

Introduction: Decision-Making in the EU During the Euro Crisis[1]

In the last decade, the European Union (EU) was confronted with several major crises. Besides the current refugee crisis and the World Financial and Economic Crisis 2008-2009, the Euro Crisis 2010ff has arguably been the most severe challenge for the EU in its history. The Horizon 2020 project "The Choice for Europe After Maastricht" (EMU-SCEUS) investigates how EU member states collectively responded to this latter crisis by negotiating and adopting reforms of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The project is particularly interested in the preferences and saliences of the involved actors in EU decision-making. With information on these two elements, we can comprehensively analyze the politics of fiscal and economic integration, with the ultimate goal to identify feasible proposals for further EMU reforms in the future.

The first aim of our project is thus the development of a dataset on EU member states' and institutions' preferences and saliences relating to reform proposals under negotiation during the Euro Crisis. In this paper we describe the organization and the different steps of the EMU-SCEUS research consortium's data collection strategy. In order to ensure a strong validity, reliability and objectivity of the dataset, this strategy combines different methodologies and includes a number of control steps. In detail, it comprises

1. the identification and selection of policy proposals to be included into the dataset,
2. the identification and selection of the relevant policy issues of the selected proposals,
3. the definition of the policy space and the coding of positions and saliences of both EU member states and selected European institutions for each selected issue, based on document analysis,
4. the validation and completion of the dataset through expert interviews,
5. the triangulation of the data resulting from the document analysis and the interviews in view of constructing a unified dataset.

After the joint definition and selection of the (universe of) policy proposals, each of the eight consortium member groups independently carried out the subsequent steps of the data collection phase for a specific subset of policy proposals. All member groups had to follow the standardized procedure that is described in this codebook. The groups were asked to meticulously document their proceedings to enable a maximum replicability of the different operations undertaken. The consortium members based at the University of Salzburg administered and coordinated the whole decentralized data collection.

Before detailing the different steps of the data collection process, a comment needs to be made on how our data collection procedure relates to previous work done in the area of EU policy-making, and in particular to the Decision-making in the European Union datasets (DEU I & II) (Thomson et al. 2006, Thomson et al. 2012). This project had a major impact in the field of EU studies (cf. Mattila 2012, 452f) and "in many ways presents the best that scholarship on EU decision-making currently has to offer"

[1] We thank Daniela Kroll, Kerstin Radtke, Sophia Schemel and the SCEUS team for fruitful discussions and very helpful comments on earlier versions of this codebook.

(Princen 2012, 624). Since two of the consortium members, Stefanie Bailer and Dirk Leuffen, had been part of the DEU I or DEU II teams, respectively, we are well informed about how these teams executed the data collection in their project. While our approach is largely inspired by the DEU approach, we included some notable differences that relate to the consortium's decision to focus on one particular policy area, namely EMU. This focus implied that we had to deviate from the DEU approach with regard to proposal selection. Furthermore, we decided to include an additional step between the identification and selection of policy proposals and the interview phase. In particular, prior to approaching experts, the consortium members were asked to collect data from secondary and primary sources (such as newspaper accounts or official statements by political actors) to get a first empirical understanding of the most important issues, the policy space of the issues as well as on actors' positions on these issues. All consortium members thus gained a strong expertise of 'their' policy proposals right from the start. In the next step, expert interviews shall be conducted to validate the data collected from the document analysis. These interviews will moreover be used to collect information on missing data on actors' positions as well as salience scores. We believe that this two-step procedure contributes to improving the quality of our dataset, as it enables us to conduct 'better' interviews. Beyond that, in order to combine the information assembled from different sources, we are planning to use a new data aggregation strategy, which will be outlined in more detail below.

Our dataset – once completed – can be used for deeper analyses of EU decision-making on EMU reform proposals during the Euro Crisis. Beyond that, scholars may use it to contribute to the literatures on the dimensionality of EU politics[2], the influence of specific actors in EU decision-making[3], or the relative strength of theoretical models of legislative bargaining.[4]

1. Identification and Selection of Policy Proposals

Applied spatial analyses of EU decision-making necessitate comprehensive knowledge on member states' preferences and saliences on concrete *contested issues* within one or several *policy proposal(s)*. Starting with the latter, the selection of policy proposals largely depends on the research interest or the concrete research question at hand. As our project focuses on explaining EU decision-making on EMU reform proposals under negotiation during the Euro crisis, we first of all defined the relevant time period for our investigation as the period between 01.01.2010 and 31.12.2014.[5] Secondly, unlike the DEU project we

[2] (Mattila and Lane 2001, Mattila 2004, Selck 2004, Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004, Kaeding and Selck 2005, Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005, Thomson 2009, Bailer 2011).

[3] (Steunenberg 2002, Tsebelis 1994, Tsebelis and Garrett 2000, Tsebelis 2002, Stokman and Thomson 2004, Thomson and Hosli 2006, Warntjen 2008, Arregui and Thomson 2009, Aksoy 2010, Golub 2012, Costello and Thomson 2013, Cross 2013, Beyers et al. 2014, Dür, Bernhagen, and Marshall 2015).

[4] (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994, Thomson et al. 2006, Schneider, Finke, and Bailer 2010, Thomson 2011).

[5] The starting date corresponds to the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in late December 2009, and precedes the first extraordinary European Council on the Euro Crisis that took place on 11 February 2010 (cf. Gocaj and Meunier 2013, 241). The turning point of this crisis was Mario Draghi's London speech on 26.06.2012

were not only interested in proposals on secondary legislation, understood as proposals for directives and regulations, but also on proposals for primary law changes, i.e. proposals for treaty changes or for new intergovernmental treaties discussed in the European Council, as well as on strategic policy papers of the EU institutions outlining the future development of the EMU, i.e. the so-called "Presidents' Reports". While proposals of the latter two types were retracted from the European Council's conclusions, which can be downloaded from the institution's webpage, proposals for secondary legislation were searched in the EU's EurLex database. As the resulting number of proposals from the latter search was too big to ensure a proper analysis, a further selection criterion was added, namely political importance. This criterion is operationalized as being mentioned in the European Council conclusions.

Consequently, we selected a number of proposals, which can be summarized in four thematical groups:

1. proposals on the set-up of a mechanism for fiscal crisis management, i.e. the (temporary) European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which was later turned into the (permanent) European Stability Mechanism (ESM),
2. proposals on new or revised rules concern fiscal policy and economic policy coordination, notably the so-called "Six-Pack", the "Two-Pack", and the "Fiscal Compact",
3. proposals on new or revised rules for the effective and harmonious supervision of financial markets in general and the banking sector in particular, which took the form of the Single Rulebook (SRB), the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for the Euro area,
4. two major proposals for even further EMU integration, i.e. a proposal for the introduction of Eurobonds on the one hand, and two comprehensive reform agendas tabled by the four/five presidents of the major EU institutions on the other hand.

In the data collection phase of the EMU-SCEUS project, each consortium member group is responsible for collecting data on the preferences and saliences for a specific set of proposals included in one policy package. The Universities of Stockholm and Konstanz investigate the emergency mechanisms EFSF and ESM, respectively, fiscal and economic policy reforms are examined by Zurich and Rome (Six-Pack, Two-Pack) as well as Budapest (Fiscal Compact), and the responsibility for financial markets supervision lies with Norwich. Pending proposals on further integration are investigated by Grenoble (Green paper on Eurobonds) and Salzburg (Four/Five Presidents' Reports on genuine EMU).

("The ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to save the Euro") and the subsequent announcement of the European Central Bank's (ECB) Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme in August 2012 (Yiangou, O'Keeffe, and Glöckler 2013, 234); from that time on, market fears of an uncontrolled Euro area breakdown calmed down. During 2014, Ireland and Portugal managed to exit their respective EFSF programmes, and Cyprus and Greece partially regained access to the financial markets. While the specific Greek crisis resumed in 2015 after the election of the Syriza government, observers considered the Euro Crisis to be over by the end of 2014.

2. Identification and Selection of the Relevant Policy Issues

While the selection of policy proposals proved to be a quite straightforward task, and while there is an abundant literature on the promises and pitfalls of different techniques for the measurement of member state preferences[6], the task of defining contested issues within a given set of policy proposals has not yet received much scholarly attention.

This is unfortunate, since a meaningful spatial analysis of member state positions and saliences largely depends on well-defined, unambiguous issues (cf. Princen 2012, 624f). Before measuring concrete preferences, the controversial aspects of a proposal have to be pinned down and transformed into policy spaces.

Three different approaches to delineate controversial issues within a given (set of) EU policy proposal(s) from each other are used in the literature. Scholars either 1) select *all* issues from a (set of) proposal(s), e.g. by treating all clauses of a legislative proposal or a draft intergovernmental treaty as contested issues (see e.g. Thurner, Pappi, and Stoiber 2002, 26), 2) select *a limited number* of issues from a proposal by applying certain selection criteria to the full population of issues (see e.g. König and Hug 2006a), or 3) confer the task of contested issue selection upon external experts, notably political decision-makers or administrative staff working at national ministries, member states' permanent representations, or EU institutions (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994, Thomson et al. 2006, Thomson et al. 2012, Beyers et al. 2014).

The first approach seemed hardly feasible for our project, since we decided not to focus on a single proposal, but rather to collect data on an initially unknown number of proposals on primary and secondary law changes. We therefore decided to combine approaches two and three by first running a document analysis which was then, in a second step, complemented by expert interviews. For the document analysis we used *Euractiv.com*, an online quality newspaper that is often used as a primary source in the EU literature (see e.g. Schelkle 2013, 109, 115, Schimmelfennig 2015, 193, Schneider and Genovese 2015, 5). *Euractiv.com* intensively covers EU affairs since 1999. According to its webpage[7] the newspaper currently involves about 40 editors and journalists in 12 European capitals. Its main editorial office is based in Brussels. Both the decentralized structure and the Brussels head office with direct connections to the EU institutions should arguably decrease the risk of a 'national bias' in *Euractiv.com*'s news coverage. A further reason for the use of *Euractiv.com* is that its complete archive can be accessed for free; this is neither the case for newspapers, like *Financial Times* or *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, nor for other EU news agencies, such as *Agence Europe*.

[6] The most commonly used measurement tools for the study of preferences in EU research are historical reviews of primary and secondary sources (e.g. Moravcsik 1998, cf. also the critical review by Lieshout, Segers, and van der Vleuten 2004), hand-coded content analyses of European party manifestos (e.g. Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006, Veen 2011), computerized quantitative text analyses (e.g. Benoit et al. 2005, Klüver 2013), expert surveys (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006, Bakker et al. 2015), and expert interviews (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994, Thurner, Pappi, and Stoiber 2002, König and Hug 2006b, Thomson et al. 2006, Thomson et al. 2012).

[7] See <http://www.euractiv.com/faq> and <http://www.euractiv.com/mediapartners> (last retrieved 12.11.2015).

For each proposal, newspaper articles from *Euractiv.com* were selected according to a keyword search[8] with search terms related to the policy proposal(s) of interest. In cases where the official and public discourses constantly referred to a particular proposal with a single term, this term was used (e.g. "European Stability Mechanism"). If not, different search terms, which were closely linked to the title of the proposal (e.g. "Presidents' Report"), were tried in an iterative fashion. This procedure aimed at maximizing the number of relevant articles resulting from the search, while at the same time minimizing the number of resulting articles that do not cover the negotiations on the respective proposal of interest. Only 'news' articles, but not e.g. interviews or editorial letter were downloaded in order to assure a replicable proposal identification strategy.

Subsequently, the whole corpus of relevant *Euractiv.com* articles was subjected to a qualitative coding procedure, using the software *Atlas.ti*. Depending on the individual teams' pre-knowledge of the proposal under investigation, the first round of the coding procedure was a more or less straightforward endeavour. The initial coding process was open-ended in the sense that the coders had to subsume bits of information on seemingly contested issues in the proposal under investigation under common labels. This was sometimes fairly easy, especially when the issue and the major contenders, and sometimes also their respective positions, were explicitly mentioned in a single sentence or paragraph of an article. Other sentences or paragraphs in the respective text corpuses, however, were more complex, which made it more difficult to code them. We therefore iterated the coding procedure several times in order to reformulate the labels until they fitted the information in the most optimal way.

After the coding of the individual articles for each policy proposal, we ranked all contested issues within one proposal according to the sums of articles within which the issues were covered.[9] Based on findings of the literature on the journalistic coverage of politic (for an overview, see Wyss and Keel 2010, Jungherr 2014, 240-241), we assumed that the resulting list of issues would actually include the *most contested* issues within the respective proposals. We based this assumption on the following line of reasoning: One of the most important functions of the media is their gatekeeping role; out of the hyper-complex political reality, journalists select a limited number of elements that reach the public (Shoemaker and Vos 2009). This selection is not random, but rather follows specific criteria; the media is especially prone to cover "items that allow the personalization of politics, the illustration, staging, and dramatization of political contest […], and negativity" (Jungherr 2014, 241). The primary focus of journalists covering EU-level negotiations should consequently lie on *conflicts* between member states concerning specific issues, which are most easy

[8] On the right hand side of the *Euractiv.com* search results page, a filter for the year in which an article was published can be applied. On the left side, one can sort the articles „oldest first". This makes it possible to restrict the time period of the search to the time period of the negotiations. Unfortunately, the website does not offer to possibility to download all articles resulting from the search at once. Instead, the individual articles have to be downloaded manually. Note that the meta-database *Factiva.com,* which is available in many university libraries, also includes *Euractiv.com* and offers a much more convenient search function.

[9] Technically, this means that a particular code has been assigned to an article *at least once.*

to stage and/or dramatize. Using media sources in general, and *Euractiv.com* in particular, to define and select contested issues in EU decision-making therefore appears to be a worthwhile endeavour.

3. Definition of Policy Spaces and Coding of Positions Based on Document Analysis

Further following the literature on journalism (Jungherr 2014, 241), we assumed that journalists would especially cover the *extreme* positions on a given contested issue, because this information and/or corresponding statements by government officials are most suitable to illustrate and dramatize the negotiation dynamics. We therefore used the coded *Euractiv.com* articles to determine the respective two-dimensional policy spaces for all identified contested issues (for an overview on the spatial logic of politics see Laver 2001, 3f). Figure 1 displays a unidimensional policy space with five actors (A, B, C, D, E) and the status quo (SQ) positioned on it.

Figure 1: The Spatial Understanding of Political Conflicts



Source: own depiction.

In this figure, the ideal positions of actor A (positioned at 0) and C (positioned at 100) represent the most extreme positions of the policy space, while the positions of actor B, D and E are closer to the SQ, which lies somewhat left of the centre. D lies exactly at the middle between A and C at position 50. Without going into deeper discussions about potential negotiation dynamics or outcomes in this example, it shall be stressed that information on the positions of actor A and C alone suffices to determine the two-dimensional policy space for the respective contested issue at hand. The underlying assumption of an Euclidian space (Benoit and Laver 2006, 21ff) implies that numbers can be assigned to geometric distances, and that the same geometric distance between two points is always equivalent to the same numerical value. In other words, the geometrical distance between A and C is exactly twice as long as the distance between A and D, or D and C, respectively, which finds its numerical equivalent in the numbers 0, 50, and 100.

The pre-structuring of the respective bargaining spaces facilitated the subsequent collection of data on the positions of all involved actors in the negotiations. All project partners were not only able to identify the policy spaces for each of 'their' issues, but also identified more than 50 per cent of all member states' positions for all proposals from written sources. [The exact coding procedure will be described here, following the submission of the final datasets by all consortium partners.]

4. Validation and Filling Missing Cells Through Expert Interviews

The document analysis allows us to enter into the second stage of the data collection phase, the interview stage, with a high level of policy expertise. This is an important advantage in comparison to the DEU approach, which did not include rigorous document analyses at this stage, since it facilitates both the identification of knowledgeable interview partners as well as the conduct of solid interviews.

The interview stage has two major goals: First, it aims at validating the results of the previous document analysis, and second, it aims at filling the missing cells in the dataset. This notably applies to the actor positions actors which we were unable to identify in print sources, but also to the saliences which were not previously recorded. Expert interviews are often considered the method of choice both for measuring preferences and saliences (cf. Thomson 2011, 36ff, see also Bailer 2011, 464, Warntjen 2012).[10] Accordingly, we conduct *semi-structured* expert interviews (Dexter 1970, Leech 2002, 665, Bogner and Menz 2009, Leech et al. 2013, 210). The advantage of this approach is that it combines a standardized procedure with opportunities for the interviewees to formulate (parts of) their responses in an open-ended way. The interview transcripts should thus provide broadly comparable information on a pre-determined set of questions, but leave room for the benefits of spontaneous, creative exchanges between interviewers and experts. The draft questionnaire can be found in the annex of this paper.

4.1 Selection of Expert Interview Partners

We assume that knowledgeable experts for EU decision-making on EMU reforms during the Euro Crisis can foremost be found among desk officers and higher-ranking bureaucrats in national finance ministries, in the member states' permanent representations in Brussels, as well as in the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, and the European Central Bank (ECB). Desk officers in the permanent representations of those countries that held the rotating Presidency of the Council between 2010 and 2013 (see Table 1 for an overview of the countries holding the rotating Presidency) gained particularly deep insights in the positions and saliences of the negotiating partners, as they were responsible for brokering compromises among member states (see also Thomson et al. 2012). For those policy proposals that were mainly negotiated in the Euro Group (Puetter 2014, 155ff), we assume that the group's permanent secretariat[11], consisting of about 25 officers and hosted by the Commission (DG ECFIN), was very well informed, too. Finally, EP members, especially the responsible rapporteurs for

[10] Thomson (2006) and König et al. (2007) respectively cross-checked the DEU data with information gathered from interviews with different experts and found "an extremely high match" (König et al. 2007, 283), and "a high level of congruence" (cf. Thomson 2011, 37) between the estimated positions (cf. also Junge and König 2007, 479). Comparing the DEU data with information based on interviews with EP rapporteurs, König et al. (2007) find that the point estimation of 15 positions is the same (deviation of 0-5 on a scale ranging from 0 to 100), 13 positions are close (deviation of 6-25), four positions are not comparable due to missing values, and only three positions deviate substantially (50, 50, 70).

[11] See <http://europa.eu/efc/secretariat/index_en.htm> (last retrieved 15.01.2016).

secondary law proposals, are considered to possess comprehensive knowledge on the positions and saliences of the key actors.

Table 1: Member States Holding the Council Presidency (2010 – 2013)

Year	Semester	Council Presidency	A: Link to Presidency Webpage Archive B: Link to Permanent Representation Webpage
2010	1st	Spain	A: *No link to archive available* B: http://representacionpermanente.eu
2010	2nd	Belgium	A: http://www.eutrio.be *B: No link available* (but see the list of responsible persons 2010: http://www.eutrio.be/files/bveu/media/source 1854/documents/Whos_who_web_-rectifie.pdf)
2011	1st	Hungary	A: *No link to archive available* B: http://brusszel.eu.kormany.hu/en
2011	2nd	Poland	A: *No link to archive available* B: http://brusszel.eu.kormany.hu/en
2012	1st	Denmark	A: http://eu2012.dk/en B: http://eu.um.dk/en/
2012	2nd	Cyprus	A: http://www.cy2012.eu/ B: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/PermRep/PermRep_ Brussels.nsf/ index_en/index_en?OpenDocument
2013	1st	Ireland	A: http://eu2013.ie B: https://www.dfa.ie/prep/brussels/
2013	2nd	Lithuania	A: http://www.eu2013.lt/en/ B: http://www.eurep.mfa.lt/eurep/en/

Source: own depiction, partially based on (Council of the European Union 2007)

Ministerial bureaucrats and desk officers in the permanent representations of the member states as well as in the supranational EU organs are usually responsible for specific policy proposals, e.g. the European emergency mechanism (initially the EFSF, which later became the ESM), or for a bundle of legislative reforms included in the Six-Pack. The scope of responsibility also depends on the size of the national bureaucracy; ministerial staff in large member states is often more specialized than in small member states. In our view, all consortium members should select and contact potentially knowledgeable experts in their own responsibility on the basis of their policy expertise. If the consortium finds it useful, information on the experts can be collected either at Salzburg or Konstanz, in order to avoid different teams contacting the same personnel.

4.2 Validation of Existing Data on Issues, Policy Spaces, and Positions

The first goal of the interviews is to validate the already collected data. In our view, there are two possible ways to do this. First, expert interviews could be conducted without mentioning the previously recorded data to the experts and then, in a next step, comparing the data derived from these different sources in terms of a convergent/discriminant validation (Adcock and Collier 2001). In a second strategy, experts could be confronted with data previously collected on the basis of the document analysis. While this second strategy runs a risk of inducing a confirmation bias, i.e. that interview partners will simply agree with our pre-existing issue list and the corresponding policy spaces and positions, it still possesses some important advantages. First, previous data collections in the EU27 and EU28 have shown that it has become rather difficult and time-consuming to collect data on all member states after the 'Big Bang' Eastern enlargement. It has proved as almost impossible to find experts, which are able to identify the positions and saliences of all countries plus the European institutions for different issues of complex policy proposals. Furthermore, but related to this, by starting from the scratch during each interview it is difficult to establish a common content and structure allowing to integrate different sources. In contrast, the integrative method to some extent follows a 'Baysian updating' logic, ideally increasing the certainty of the quality of our measurement with the number of sources consulted. Moreover, the method assures certain clarity since the concepts and the spaces are carefully spelled out in advance. Since experts are selected for evaluating the previously collected data, it is assumed that they – in their quality as educated and experienced professionals – are able and courageous enough to point out possible errors in the data. Lastly, the experts are also invited to point out additional issues and aspects that have not previously been recorded. The interviews thus follow a middle path between stringency and openness to allow critique and establish new findings. Note that the experience of the DEU project points out that the risk of confirmation bias should not be overestimated; interview partners were actually quite willing to challenge the views of the interviewers.

In addition, to further reduce the risk of confirmation bias, we propose a wording of the interview questions, which should invite our respondents to critically assess the quality of our previously collected data. In particular, the questionnaire frames the existing data as primarily based on journalistic accounts; thereby shifting the possible 'blame' to journalists and inviting respondents to challenge their accounts. Taking a distant, neutral position during the interview will moreover avoid tensions between interviewers and experts: In case an expert's assessment of the substantive conflicts diverges from our view, s/he would not have to dismiss 'our' understanding of the negotiations, but just data based on media sources.

First the experts need to check whether we have correctly identified and specified the most important contested issues in the EU-level negotiations. In addition they will be asked whether there are important contested issues missing in our dataset (see also our questionnaire draft in the appendix). In addition, the experts should be asked to provide information on the policy space of each issue. In this step, we want to know whether we have correctly identified the most extreme positions on each issue (0, 100), the status quo/reversion point, the outcome, and whether we have correctly coded possible intermediary positions

held by member states and EU institutions. Finally, the experts should be asked about the positions of these actors.

4.3 Completion of Positions in the Dataset

An expert who feels competent to judge whether the already assigned positions are correct is likely to possess information on the positions of missing actors as well. The interviewee should thus be asked to provide this information whenever possible. In order to assess the quality of this information, the interviewer should always ask for a justification of the positioning (cf. the DEU procedure, Thomson/Stokman 2006: 36ff). Of course, in case an interviewee disagrees about the issues or specific issue spaces previously recorded for the discussed proposal, s/he should be asked to name the issues, specify the issue space and fill out the missing positions.

4.4 Measuring Salience

Finally, we ask the interviewee to assess the saliences that actors attached to their positions (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994, Thomson et al. 2006, Thomson et al. 2012, alternative methods for salience measurement are discussed by Warntjen 2012, 169ff). Asking for saliences is crucial for the analysis of EMU reforms during the Euro Crisis and beyond, because it is a core concept of political analysis that is included in many theoretical models of decision-making (cf. Achen, 2006: 92; Golub, 2012; Schneider et al., 2010). For instance, it features prominently in models of vote choice, public opinion research, interest group politics, and formal and informal models of legislative decision-making (cf. Leuffen, Malang, and Wörle 2014, 617ff).

We propose to follow Thomson et al.'s (2006; 2012: 612) understanding of the concept; using the term synonymously with 'importance' or 'intensity' (cf. Achen, 2006; Warntjen, 2012: 169). More concretely, we would build on the following understanding of salience developed by Thomson and Stokman (2006: 41ff; see also Achen, 2006): "salience is understood as the extent to which actors experience utility loss from the occurrence of decision outcomes that differ from the decision outcomes they most favour." In other words, salience "describes the sharpness in the curvature of [an] actor's loss function. Actors who attach high levels of salience to an issue are highly sensitive to small deviations from their most favored positions, while actors who attach low levels of salience are less sensitive" (Thomson and Stokman, 2006, p. 42).

It is important to explain to the interviewee that saliences are independent from actors' preferences (see also Thomson 2011, 45). An actor holding an extreme position in the negotiations on a specific issue within a certain proposal may attach only medium or low salience to this position. Vice versa, an actor holding a centrist position (i.e. a position that equals 50 on our 0 to 100 scale) may attach a high or even extremely high salience to it. The experts should place each actor on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 5 for each issue (1 = not salient at all; 2 = slightly salient; 3 = moderately salient; 4 = very salient; 5 =

extremely salient).[12] In the course of the DEU project, interviewers made the experience that it was useful to first ask for the actor with the highest salience score on any of the issues within a given proposal, and then to fill the other cells relative to this 'benchmark'.

5. Triangulating Data in View of Constructing a Unified Dataset

In order to evaluate the expertise of the interviewees, the DEU project members continuously asked the experts to justify their assessments. In DEU I, only the estimates of the most trustworthy or knowledgeable expert were included in the dataset (Thomson 2011: 35); in other words, the DEU project usually followed the "winner-takes-it-all" data aggregation strategy (Leuffen, Shikano, and Walter 2013).

We propose to deviate from the DEU project in this regard, because the "winner-takes-it-all" strategy implies a huge and irreversible loss of potentially valuable information. In order to avoid this loss, and in view of Leuffen et al.'s (2013) finding that weighted averages generally outperform all other potential data aggregation strategies, such as random selection, the majority strategy, or the very winner-takes-it-all strategy, we propose to collect the information provided by different experts on separate sheets, and assign an individual knowledge score (K) to each interviewee (note, however, that the following weighted average triangulation procedure is only possible if the different sources agree about the definition of the issue space; if not, i.e. if they are assuming different spaces, the data cannot easily be aggregated or averaged). For our knowledge score, a Likert-type scale could be used: 1 = very poor knowledge; 2 = poor; 3 = satisfactory; 4 = good; 5 = very good knowledge. The decision on the knowledge score should be taken by the interviewer, based on his/her judgement of the interviewees' capability to explain why s/he has assigned specific positions and saliences to certain actors. A corresponding score should also be assigned to the data sources used in first stage of the data collection phase, i.e. the written sources (1 = very low trustworthiness; 2 = low; 3 = satisfactory; 4 = high; 5 = very high trustworthiness). For instance, primary documents from member states directly expressing their positions should be assigned a score of 5, quality newspapers like the Financial Times could receive a score of 4, and so on. This would allow building weighted averages for all positions in our dataset.

To give an example, one contested issue within the proposal on the ESM was the scope of the permanent rescue mechanism. The policy space of this issue was structured according to actors' willingness to give the ESM less or more instruments to directly or indirectly support Euro area member states in financial trouble. Position 0 was coded as "narrow scope, very limited flexibility (loans for Euro Area governments only)", while position 100 was coded as "Wide scope, great flexibility (including bank recapitalisation and

[12] The use of a 0 to 100 scale in interviews, as it has been done in the DEU approach, may be considered as over-complex, in the sense that an expert would be unable to judge the difference between values such as 76, 77, or 78 (Krosnick and Presser 2010, 270). In our view, a scale ranging from 1 to 5 should facilitate answering the question about salience as it is commonly used in standardized survey questionnaires (and it can, of course, easily be transformed into a scale ranging from 0 to 100, if preferred by an analyst). The reformed scale also has the advantage of making it very clear that saliences and positions are separate concepts.

purchases of government debt bonds on the markets)". In an article published on *Euractiv.com*, which could be called "source one" (S_1) the position of Spain (P_{ESP}) is summarized in the following way: "Spain has argued not only for an increase of the funds, but also for a higher flexibility of its powers in order to stop the contagion of the debt crisis".[13] Based on this statement, the position of Spain has been coded as 100. However, as the article neither refers to any sources nor indicates who exactly expressed this position on behalf of Spain, the knowledge score of this article would be 2 (K_1). The Financial Times (S_2) reports that "Mr Rajoy's government is contemplating outside aid for banks in the form of a direct injection of funds from the eurozone's €500bn rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism, or a new round of sovereign bond purchases by the ECB."[14] This statement indicates that Spain prefers the ESM to directly support private banks, but mentions bond purchases only with reference to the ECB, not the ESM. It thus suggests a position of 80, instead of 100, for Spain on the issue of the ESM's scope. The general knowledge score of the Financial Times would be 4 (K_2). If a knowledgeable interview partner (S_3), e.g. a desk officer in the Council secretariat, with a knowledge score of 5 (K_3) would support the reading of the Financial Times and would plausibly argue that the Spanish position was not as "extreme" as e.g. the Italian one, which preferred the ESM to do both recapitalize banks and purchase sovereign debt bonds, and would accordingly assign a score of 70 to Spain, the advantages of the averaging strategy play out. While keeping the information of all three sources, the weighted average would equal the products of the respective knowledge scores with the corresponding positions, divided by the sum of knowledge scores, or more formally

$$\frac{K_1 \times S_1 + K_2 \times S_2 + K_3 \times S_3}{\sum K} = P_{Actor}$$

The formula for the above example would accordingly read

$$\frac{2 \times 100 + 4 \times 80 + 5 \times 70}{11} = 79$$

This weighted average of 79 is much closer to the judgement of the expert (70) than to the score based on the original *Euractiv.com* article (100). This example of three sources could easily be expanded for further sources $(S_4, S_5, \ldots S_n)$. But again the strategy is only possible if the sources agree on the underlying issue space. If not, the most convincing issue and issue space definition must be selected. Thus the "winner-takes-it-all" strategy must precede the weighting operation.

[13] See <http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/member-states-negotiation-positions-news-509524> (last retrieved 15.01.2016).

[14] See <https://next.ft.com/content/886473c0-abd7-11e1-a8da-00144feabdc0> (last retrieved 15.01.2016).

Figure 2: Example for Weighting Average Strategy



Conclusion: The Best of Two Worlds – Combining Document Analysis and Expert Interviews

Our data collection builds on two techniques, mainly the analysis of documents and expert interviews. By combining these two approaches we hope to improve the validity, reliability and objectivity of our measurement. The document analysis paves the way for a better understanding of the topics and issues under discussion. The interviews are used for validating the data derived from the document analysis and to complete the dataset concerning i) the definition of contested issues, ii) the issue spaces, iii) the positions of the actors and iv) the saliences attached to these positions. In this short manuel we have tried to formalize the procedure of our data collection as much as possible. The basic aim of this is to assure a high degree of replicability and a strong agreement of the methods used by different members of the consortium. It is hoped that this contribution serves to point out some of the challenges of the data collection process and to propose possible solutions; however, our experience teaches us that different challenges will pop up during the data collection phase not yet foreseeable at this stage. Thus while formalizing the method as much as possible we still need to leave some room for improvisation. Also we refrain from defining a minimum number of interviews that should be conducted. The number of interviews should depend upon the level of agreement between the different sources used. The more high quality sources agree about issues, positions and saliences, the safer we are in the quality of our data.

The appendix of this paper contains two draft proposals for the consortium's questionnaire. The first version is an annotated questionnaire proposing more elaborate wording and additional background information that the interviewer might want to share with the interviewee. The second version is a shorter version of this questionnaire designed for a more practical usage in the interviews. In addition we have attached two examples sheets to be used for recording positions and saliences; the first is an example of a working sheet already containing some example data points, the second is a fresh sheet to be filled in the course of the data collection process. Finally we have attached an example for how positions can be coded in a uni-dimensional policy space. Possibly the interviewers might want to show the example to the interviewees in order to make them familiar with the method.

ANNOTATED QUESTIONNAIRE

Mainly for preparatory purposes!

Opening

1. Welcoming and thanking for participation

2. Introducing oneself, handing over your business card…

3. Background information and purpose of interview

Our project aims to understand the preferences and saliences of EU member states and EU institutions relating to reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), especially during the Euro Crisis. It is funded by the EU's Horizon 2020 programme. We cover a range of reform proposals, including the ESM, the Six-Pack or the Banking Union.

The benefit of this project will be to shed light on both cleavages and common ground within the EU concerning EMU reforms. This will help us to provide guidance for the successful implementation of future reforms of EMU governance.

In our project, we assume that we can depict positions of member states and EU institutions on scales ranging from 0 to 100. The number of positions may vary; for some issues, only two potential positions exist, e.g. reject a point or support it (0, 100). In other cases, EU member states and institutions may have preferred several solutions for one issue, located at e.g. 0, 50, and 100 [show example, see below].

4. Permission to record the interview

If you agree, our discussion will be recorded. The recordings will only be listened to by members of our research consortium, and used solely for the purpose of this Horizon 2020 research project. Your name and other personal information will be kept confidential. If you feel uncomfortable with the recorder during the interview, you may ask that it be turned off at any time. Is that ok with you?

5. Information about the interviewee's role or position during the concerned decision-making process

Before we enter into the discussion, let me ask you what was your role or position during the decision-making process on [proposal name]?

Part I. Validation and Completion of Issue List, Policy Spaces, and Coded Positions

1. Validation of Issue List

During the negotiations on [proposal name] several controversial issues emerged, on which member states could not agree right from the start. In preparation of this interview, we conducted an analysis of written sources, predominantly quality newspapers, which resulted in the following list of controversial issues [show issue list]

Q1: Does the "journalistic account" of the controversial issues on [proposal name] confirm to your remembrance? Are there controversial issues missing on our list?

In case the interviewee does not name further contested issues, directly proceed to question Q3.

Q2: Could you recall which further issues were contested in the Council and/or between the Council and the other EU institutions?

2. Validation of Policy Spaces

Based on our sources, we translated or coded the positions of the member states and the EU institutions on the respective issues into policy spaces, like the one I showed you at the beginning of this interview.

Take out the working sheet (see the example WORKING SHEET below) for the first confirmed issue. Repeat this procedure successively for all confirmed issues.

For [first issue, second issue, …], the "journalistic account" suggest the following extreme position [read up positions 0 and 100]. Furthermore, journalists identified the following positions taken during the negotiations by one or more actors [read up/show other positions].

Q3: Does the "journalistic account" of the policy space of [issue] correspond to your understanding of this issue? Are there positions missing or incorrectly specified?

3. Validation of Coded Positions

In case the interviewee confirms the policy space for an issue, the corresponding working sheet can now be presented to him/her. If the interviewee does not corroborate the policy space that was previously identified, or if s/he adds contested issues to the list, directly proceed to question Q8.

Q4: Could you please assess whether the scores correctly represent the actors' positions on [issue] before the Council/European Council adopted a common position on the proposal in [month, year]? Or should they be placed somewhere else?

The answers should ideally be qualified by asking about reasons and contents of positions.

Q5: Could you please explain why [actor] held [that position]?

4. Validation of Status Quo/Reference Point

The status quo/reference point indicates the outcome if no decision would have been taken, e.g. if actors cannot agree on changing an existing EU policy. Sometimes a status quo/reference point does not exist, though. This could be the case if a policy is completely new (e.g. the ESM).

Q6: Is the status quo/reference point for this issue correctly positioned in the policy space?

5. Validation of Outcome

The outcome describes the actual decision that was adopted by the Council [the Euro Group] and, in case, the European Parliament with regard to the respective issues.

Q7: Is the outcome for this issue correctly positioned in the policy space?

Part II. Coding Positions of Missing Actors

Completion of Working Sheet / Filling in Positions on a Fresh Sheet

Working Sheet: As you can see, there are some/many blank spaces on our sheet, since our newspaper sources have not covered all actors' positions.

Fresh Sheet: If the expert does not corroborate the policy space for an issue, take out a Fresh sheet (see example FRESH SHEET below) and directly ask Q8.

Q8: Could you indicate the positions of the (missing) actors on [issue] before the Council/European Council adopted a common position on the proposal in [month, year]?

Again, the answers should be qualified by asking about reasons and contents of positions.

Q9: Could you please explain to me why [actor] held [this position]?

Part III. Coding Saliences

I already briefly mentioned the issue of importance or salience that an actor can attach to his or her position. In our understanding, the salience score for each actor and issue may range from 1 to 5. A score of 5 indicates that an issue is of highest importance to an actor, while a score of 1 indicates that the issue is of no importance to an actor at all. A score of 3 indicates that the issue has an average level of priority for the actor concerned, involving the will to use arguments but not power politics to convince opponents. Note that it is possible for an actor to attach a high level of salience to an issue on which it takes a moderate position, and a low level of salience to an issue on which it takes an extreme position.

Q10: Could you please indicate the salience each actor attached to [issue], ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = not salient at all; 2 = slightly salient; 3 = moderately salient; 4 = very salient; 5 = extremely salient).

The answers should be qualified by asking for reasons of the importance attached to the issues.

Q11: Why did [actor] prioritize [position] as it did?

Additional Questions

Additional questions should only be asked if time permits. Their selection depends on the suggestions made by the consortium members. Potential questions could concern the role of domestic actors or questions about temporal aspects of the decision-making process. Possibly, the dynamics of decision-making could be explored in more depth (power…).

Concluding Remarks

Thank the interviewee and ask final questions

Thank you very much for answering all these questions and sharing your expertise. This helps us tremendously!

Q12: Is there anything else that you think is important, but I haven't asked for yet?

Finally, I wonder if I could possibly come back to you in the future with some follow-up question, if necessary?

Are there persons that you would recommend that we should consult for even better understanding the decision-making processes?

Is there anything else that *you* would like to ask me? [e.g. explanation of further project steps]

Thank the interviewee once again for his/her time.

The Choice for Europe After Maastricht. Member States' Preferences for Economic and Fiscal Integration

QUESTIONNAIRE

General Information (to be filled out by the consortium member)

Interview ID: __|__|__ (1st digit: Consortium member → 1 = SCEUS, 2 = CEU, 3 = UKON, 4 = SU, 5 = UEA, 6 = LUISS, 7 = ETHZ, 8 = CNRS); 2nd digit: Interviewer No.; 3rd digit: Interviewee No.)

Interviewer name: _____

Interviewee name: _____

Short bio interviewee

Position/role during negotiations: _____

Position/role today (since when): _____

Gender: _____

Nationality: _____

Other important information: _____

Date of Interview: _____

Location _____

Begin: _____ End: _____ Duration (= Δ): _____

Language of Interview: _____

Quality of interview: □ 1 (very poor), □ 2 (poor), □ 3 (satisfactory), □ 4 (good), □ 5 (very good)

Proposal(s) covered: _____

Additional remarks (e.g. on atmosphere or disturbances during the interview, …): _____

_____

_____

_____

Part I. Validation and Completion of Issue List, Policy Spaces, and Coded Positions

Q1: Does the "journalistic account" of the controversial issues on [proposal name] conform to your remembrance? Are there controversial issues missing on our list?

> **If yes:** Q2: Could you recall which further issues were contested in the Council and/or between the Council and the other EU institutions?

Q3: Does the "journalistic account" of the policy space of [issue] correspond to your understanding of this issue? Are there positions missing or incorrectly specified?

> **If yes**: Q4: Could you please assess whether the scores correctly represent the actors' positions on [issue] before the Council/European Council adopted the proposal in [month, year]? Or should they be placed somewhere else?
>
> Q5: Could you please explain to me why [actor] held [that position]?

Q6: Is the status quo/reference point for this issue correctly positioned in the policy space?

Q7: Is the outcome for this issue correctly positioned in the policy space?

Part II. Coding Positions of (Missing) Actors

Q8: Could you indicate the positions of the (missing) actors on [issue] before the Council/European Council adopted the proposal in [month, year]?

> **If yes:** Q9: Could you please explain to me why [actor] held [this position]?

Part III. Coding Saliences

Q10: Could you please indicate the salience each actor attached to [issue], ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = not salient at all; 2 = slightly salient; 3 = moderately salient; 4 = very salient; 5 = extremely salient).

> **If yes:** Q11: Why did [actor] prioritize [position] as it did?

Concluding Remarks

Q12: Is there anything else that you think is important, but I haven't asked for it yet?

WORKING SHEET (example)

Proposal: ESM_____

Issue: Size of the ESM_____

Issue Space: 0=Restrictive, 100=Expansive (binary)___

	POS	POS New		SALIENCE
AUT	**100**			
BUL	**.**			
BEL	**100**			
CRO	**.**			
CYP	**100**			
CZE	**.**			
DNK	**.**			
EST	**100**			
FIN	**100**			
FRA	**100**			
GER	**0**			
GRE	**100**			
HUN	**.**			
IRL	**100**			
ITA	**100**			

LAT			
LIT	.		
LUX			
MLT			
NED			
POL			
POR			
ROM			
SLK			
SLO			
ESP			
SWE			
UK			
COM			
ECB			
EuroGroup			
ECOFIN			
EUCO PRES			
EP			
Outcome			

FRESH SHEET

Proposal: _____

Issue: _____

Issue Space: _____

	POSITION		SALIENCE
AUT			
BUL			
BEL			
CRO			
CYP			
CZE			
DNK			
EST			
FIN			
FRA			
GER			
GRE			
HUN			
IRL			
ITA			
LAT			
LIT			
LUX			
MLT			
NED			
POL			

POR			
ROM			
SLK			
SLO			
ESP			
SWE			
UK			
COM			
ECB			
EuroGroup			
ECOFIN			
EUCO PRES			
EP			
Outcome			

UNIDIMENSIONAL POLICY SPACE: EXAMPLE

Proposal: Working Time Directive (COD/2004/209), under negotiation between 2004-2009 (ultimately no agreement between Council and EP)

Issue: The optout from the maximum working week

Issue Space: 0= Keep the opt-out

50 = keep the opt-out, but specify exemptions

100 = phase out opt-out



Source: own depiction, based on data provided by (Thomson et al. 2012)

Literature

Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research." *American Political Science Review* 95 (03):529-546. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055401003100.

Aksoy, Deniz. 2010. ""It Takes a Coalition": Coalition Potential and Legislative Decision Making." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35 (4):519-542.

Arregui, Javier, and Robert Thomson. 2009. "States' bargaining success in the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (5):655-676.

Bailer, Stefanie. 2011. "Structural, Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers." *Negotiation Journal* 27 (4):447-475.

Bakker, Ryan, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Milada A. Vachudova. 2015. "Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-2010." *Party Politics* 21 (1):143-152.

Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2006. *Party Politics in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.

Benoit, Kenneth, Michael Laver, Christine Arnold, Paul Pennings, and Madeleine O. Hosli. 2005. "Measuring National Delegate Positions at the Convention on the Future of Europe Using Computerized Word Scoring." *European Union Politics* 6 (3):291-313. doi: 10.1177/1465116505054834.

Beyers, Jan, Laura C. Bonafont, Andreas Dür, Rainer Eising, Danica Fink-Hafner, David Lowery, Christine Mahoney, William Maloney, and Daniel Naurin. 2014. "The INTEREURO Project: Logic and structure." *Interest groups & Advocacy* 3 (2):126-140.

Bogner, Alexander, and Wolfgang Menz. 2009. "Experteninterviews in der qualitativen Sozialforschung." In *Experteninterviews. Theorien, Methoden, Anwendungsfelder. Dritte Auflage*, edited by Alexander Bogner, Beate Littig and Wolfgang Menz, 7-31. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum, eds. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Frans N. Stokman, eds. 1994. *European Community Decision-Making. Models, Applications, and Comparisons*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Costello, Rory, and Robert Thomson. 2013. "The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 20 (7):1025-1039. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2013.795393.

Council of the European Union. 2007. *Council Decision of 1 January 2007 determining the order in which the office of President of the Council shall be held (2007/5/EC, Euratom), Online at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0005&qid=1403619778146&from=EN> (last retrieved 15.01.2016)*. Brussels.

Cross, James P. 2013. "Everyon'sa winner (almost): Bargainings success in the Council of Ministers of the European Union." *European Union Politics* 14 (1):70-94.

Dexter, Lewis A. 1970. *Elite and specialized interviewing*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Dür, Andreas, Patrick Bernhagen, and David Marshall. 2015. "Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?" *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (8):951-983. doi: 10.1177/0010414014565890.

Gocaj, Ledina, and Sophie Meunier. 2013. "Time Will Tell: The EFSF, the ESM, and the Euro Crisis." *Journal of European Integration* 35 (3):239-253.

Golub, Jonathan. 2012. "How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers." *Journal of European Public Policy* 19 (9):1294-1315. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2012.693413.

Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2015. *State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity*, *Find the transcript at <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf> (last retrieved 15.01.2016).* Brussels: European Commission.

Junge, Dirk, and Thomas König. 2007. "What's Wrong with EU Spatial Analysis? The Accuracy and Robustness of Empirical Applications to the Interpretation of the Legislative Process and the Specification of Preferences." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 19 (4):465-487.

Jungherr, Andreas. 2014. "The Logic of Political Coverage on Twitter: Temporal Dynamics and Content." *Journal of Communication* 64 (2):239-259.

Kaeding, Michael, and Torsten J. Selck. 2005. "Mapping out Political Europe: Coalition Patterns in EU Decision-Making." *International Political Science Review* 26 (3):271-290.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael Macdonald. 2006. *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klüver, Heike. 2013. *Lobbying in the European Union. Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions, and Policy Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

König, Thomas, and Simon Hug. 2006a. "Introduction." In *Policy-Making Processes and the European Constitution*, edited by Thomas König and Simon Hug, 1-8. Abingdon: Routledge.

König, Thomas, and Simon Hug, eds. 2006b. *Policy-Making Processes and the European Constitution*. Abingdon: Routledge.

König, Thomas, Bjorn Lindberg, Sandra Lechner, and Winfried Pohlmeier. 2007. "Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains." *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2):281-312.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Stanley Presser. 2010. "Question and Questionnaire Design." In *Handbook of Survey Research. Second Edition*, edited by Peter V. Mardsen and James D. Wright, 263-313. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Group.

Laver, Michael. 2001. "Why should we estimate the policy positions of political actors?" In *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, edited by Michael Laver, 3-9. London and New York: Routledge.

Leech, Beth L. 2002. "Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews." *Political Science & Politics* 35 (4):665-668.

Leech, Beth L., Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, and David C. Kimball. 2013. "Lessons from the "Lobbying and Policy Change" Project." In *Interview Reseach in Political Science*, edited by Laura Mosley, 209-224. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Leuffen, Dirk, Thomas Malang, and Sebastian M. Wörle. 2014. "Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision-Making." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52 (3):616-631.

Leuffen, Dirk, Susumu Shikano, and Stefanie Walter. 2013. "Measurement and Data Aggregation in Small-n Social Scientific Research." *European Political Science* 12:40-51.

Lieshout, Robert H. M., Mathieu L. L. Segers, and Anna M. van der Vleuten. 2004. "De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe. Soft Sources, Weak Evidence." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6 (4):89-139.

Mattila, Mikko. 2004. "Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union Council of Ministers." *European Journal of Political Research* 43 (1):29-50.

Mattila, Mikko. 2012. "Resolving controversies with DEU data." *European Union Politics* 13 (3):451-461. doi: 10.1177/1465116512441507.

Mattila, Mikko, and Jan-Erik Lane. 2001. "Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting." *European Union Politics* 2 (1):31-52.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Princen, Sebastiaan. 2012. "The DEU Approach to EU Decision-Making: A Critical Assessment." *Journal of European Public Policy* 19 (4):623-634. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2012.662039.

Puetter, Uwe. 2014. *The European Council and the Council. New intergovernmentalism and institutional change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schelkle, Waltraud. 2013. "Fiscal Integration by Default." In *Beyond the Regulatory Polity?: The European Integration of Core State Powers*, edited by Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs, 105-123. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2015. "Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis." *Journal of European Public Policy* 22 (2):177-195.

Schneider, Gerald, Daniel Finke, and Stefanie Bailer. 2010. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models." *Political Studies* 58 (1):85-103. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x.

Schneider, Gerald, and Federica Genovese. 2015. *Smoke with Fire: Financial Crises, Institutional Reform, and the Future of EU Democracy*, *Working Paper, last update March 26, 2015, online at <http://federica-genovese.com/downloads/SmokewithFire_GS_March2015.pdf> (last retrieved 12.11.2015).*

Selck, Torsten J. 2004. "On the Dimensionality of European Union Legislative Decision-Making." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16 (2):203-222. doi: 10.1177/0951629804041119.

Shoemaker, Pamela J., and Timothy P. Vos. 2009. *Gatekeeping Theory*. London: Routledge.

Steunenberg, Bernard. 2002. "An ever wider Union: the effects of enlargement on EU decision-making." In *Widening the European Union: The politics of institutional change and reform*, edited by Bernard Streunenberg, 97-118. London: Routledge.

Stokman, Frans N., and Robert Thomson. 2004. "Winners and losers in the European Union." *European Union Politics* 5 (1):5-23.

Thomson, Robert. 2006. "Comparison of expert judgements with each other and with information from Council documentation." In *The European Union Decides. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions*, edited by Robert Thomson, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher A. Achen and Thomas König, 329-347. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, Robert. 2009. "Actor alignments in the European Union before and after enlargement." *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (6):756-781.

Thomson, Robert. 2011. *Resolving Controversy in the European Union. Legislative Decision-Making before and after Enlargement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, Robert, Javier Arregui, Dirk Leuffen, Rory Costello, James Cross, Robin Hertz, and Thomas Jensen. 2012. "A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (DEUII)." *Journal of European Public Policy* 19 (4):604-622. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2012.662028.

Thomson, Robert, Jovenka Boerefijn, and Frans N. Stokman. 2004. "Actor alignments in European Union decision making." *European Journal of Political Research* 43 (2):237-261.

Thomson, Robert, and Madeleine Hosli. 2006. "Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission, Council and Parliament in Legislative Decisionmaking." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44 (2):391-417.

Thomson, Robert, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher A. Achen, and Thomas König, eds. 2006. *The European Union Decides. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thurner, Paul W., Franz U. Pappi, and Michael Stoiber. 2002. *EU intergovernmental conferences. A quantitative analytical reconstruction and data-handbook of domestic preference formation, transnational networks and dynamics of compromise during the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations*, *Arbeitspapiere / Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung 60*. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung.

Tsebelis, George. 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1):128-142.

Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tsebelis, George, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2000. "Legislative Politics in the European Union." *European Union Politics* 1 (1):5-32.

Veen, Tim. 2011. "Positions and salience in European Union politics: Estimation and validation of a new dataset." *European Union Politics* 12 (2):267-288. doi: 10.1177/1465116510394381.

Warntjen, Andreas. 2008. "The Council Presidency. Power Broker or Burden? An Empirical Analysis." *European Union Politics* 9 (3):315-228.

Warntjen, Andreas. 2012. "Measuring salience in EU legislative politics." *European Union Politics* 13 (1):168-182. doi: 10.1177/1465116511428495.

Wyss, Vinzenz, and Guido Keel. 2010. "Journalismusforschung." In *Einführung in die Publizistikwissenschaft. 3. Auflage*, edited by Heinz Bonfadelli , Otfried Jarren and Heinz Bonfadelli, 337-378. Bern: Haupt.

Yiangou, Jonathan, Mícheál O'Keeffe, and Gabriel Glöckler. 2013. "'Tough Love': How the ECB's Monetary Financing Prohibition Pushes Deeper Euro Area Integration." *Journal of European Integration* 35 (3):223-237.

Zimmer, Christina, Gerald Schneider, and Michael Dobbins. 2005. "The contested Council: Conflict dimensions of an intergovernmental EU institution." *Political Studies* 53 (2):403-422.

EMU
CHOICES

THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE SINCE MAASTRICHT
SALZBURG CENTRE OF EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 649532